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The laws that are going to be amended in this area will one day, in the 
not-too-distant future, be spoken about by me and other people to the 
amazement of our daughters and their friends.  They will be amazed 
that these laws ever existed.  I will talk about the fact that a law 
existed that provided . . . a partial excuse, for killing a domestic 
partner . . . based on the notion that it was understandable that the 
accused lost control and became so violent as to kill their partner 
because their relationship was under threat.1 
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Introduction 
Men who commit domestic homicide by killing intimate or former intimate partners often 
do so out of jealousy, possessiveness and rage—in the heat of passion.2  Women who commit 
domestic homicide often kill out of fear and despair—they kill their batterers.3  Both men and 
women frequently assert the partial defense of provocation for this ultimate act of domestic 
violence.4  If provocation is found, it reduces murder to manslaughter, which usually results in a 
substantially shorter prison sentence.5  Two gender equality issues are presented by this reality, 
both relating to domestic violence.  First, why should jealous killers be allowed to argue 
provocation when their victims did nothing legally wrong?  Second, why are most battered 
women who kill their batterers not fully excused based on self-defense? If substantive gender 
equality were considered adequately, killings out of jealousy and rage would result in murder 
convictions,6 while most killings out of fear and despair would result in acquittals.7 
                                                 
2 See Jenny Morgan, Critique and Comment, Provocation Law and Facts: Dead Women Tell No 
Tales, Tales Are Told About Them, 21 MELB. U. L. REV. 237, 256 (1997) (citing NEW SOUTH 
WALES LAW REFORM COMM’N, DISCUSSION PAPER 31, PROVOCATION, DIMINISHED 
RESPONSIBILITY & INFANTICIDE 3.98 (1993) [hereinafter NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM 
COMM’N]). 
3 See id. at 256-57. 
4 The other situation where provocation is frequently asserted is homicide as a result of a fight 
between men.  See, e.g., NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 2, at 3.8.  
5 See CAROLINE A. FORELL & DONNA M. MATTHEWS, A LAW OF HER OWN: THE REASONABLE 
WOMAN AS A MEASURE OF MAN 173-74 (New York Univ. Press 2000).  
6 See id. at 178; see also VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM'N, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE FINAL 
REPORT xv (Oct. 2004) [hereinafter VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N], http://www.lawreform. 
vic.gov.au/CA256902000FE154/Lookup/Homicide_Final_Report/$file/FinalReport.pdf.  
7 See FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 5, at 214. 
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Two visions of gender equality, formal and substantive,8 can be used to analyze the 
criminal defense of provocation as applied in domestic homicide cases.  Formal equality means 
equality of treatment so that like cases are treated alike.  Under formal gender equality, the same 
legal rule applies to men and women when both sexes engage in similar conduct or are similarly 
situated.9  This is often effective in breaking down gender stereotypes, for example, by allowing 
women to be executors of estates10 or attend state military academies.11  However, formal 
equality is problematic when used to justify retaining certain male-biased defenses, and 
expanding their application to women rather than abolishing them.  Provocation, when applied in 
domestic homicide cases, is such a defense.  
Unlike formal equality, substantive equality seeks to accommodate the varied needs and 
experiences of subordinated groups.12  Substantive gender equality insists that the law take into 
account and respond to the actual effect of a rule on both men and women, thereby better 
                                                 
8 See KATHARINE T. BARTLETT ET AL., GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 
265 (3d ed. 2002) (distinguishing between the two visions of equality described by one group of 
commentators as follows: “[w]hile formal sex equality judges the form of a rule, requiring that it 
treat women and men on the same terms without special barriers or favors on account of their 
sex, substantive equality looks to a rule’s results or effects.”).  
9 See FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 5, at 14 (explaining that although the same laws are 
applied to men and women under formal gender equality, the laws may punish women for not 
being men in areas “where consensus and commonality between men and woman simply do not 
exist”). 
10 See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971) (applying heightened scrutiny for the first time 
to gender discrimination where a statute gave mandatory preference to fathers over mothers as 
administrators of deceased child's estate).  The Court held that dissimilar treatment for men and 
women who are similarly situated violates the Equal Protection Clause.  Id.   
11 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557-58 (1996) (applying heightened scrutiny 
to Virginia Military Institute’s sex-based admissions policy and holding that denying women 
admittance because of their gender violates the Equal Protection Clause). 
12 See Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, A Conversation About Equality, 29 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 65, 
69 (2000) (remarking that: “equality isn’t just about being treated the same, and it isn’t a 
mathematical equation waiting to be solved.  Rather, it is about equal human dignity, and full 
membership in society.”). 
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assuring that justice for all is achieved.13  It requires more than just making the provocation 
defense available to both men and women who kill out of jealousy and rage, or out of fear and 
despair.  Instead, applying substantive equality would mean that killing in a heat of passion out 
of sexual possessiveness would no longer be an acceptable basis for a claim of provocation 
because everyone has a right to sexual and physical autonomy.  Applying substantive equality 
would also mean that killing one’s batterer out of fear would often be a basis for self-defense 
because everyone has a right to defend him or herself from physical harm.  
With these desired substantive gender equality outcomes in mind, this article examines 
and compares the law of provocation as it applies to domestic homicide in United States, Canada 
and the Australia.14  Every state, province and territory, with the exceptions of the Australian 
states of Tasmania and Victoria, retains some form of the provocation defense or, in some 
American states, the Model Penal Code’s even more pro-defendant extreme emotional 
disturbance defense.15  This article examines why substantive equality, prevalent under Canadian 
constitutional law,16 has not resulted in more woman-friendly provocation rules in Canada and 
                                                 
13 See id. (noting that an examination of substantive rights violations must consider the treatment 
of the different groups within the context of society, as differential treatment in some instances 
may lead to substantive equality, while similar treatment in other cases may lead to substantive 
inequality). 
14 Provocation is an area where the constitutional doctrine of equal protection has played little or 
no part in the development of the law.  Therefore, this article examines whether the statutes and 
case law in these areas are gender-biased and how much formal or substantive gender equality 
exists. 
15 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (2004).  The Code prescribes that: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when . . . (b) a homicide which 
would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse.  The 
reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the 
viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he 
believes them to be. 
Id. 
16 See infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.  
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why Australia is the leader in incorporating substantive equality into its provocation doctrine. 
I. Provocation Overview 
The origins of the provocation defense are deeply gendered; it was created for and has 
always been used far more often by men than women.  Well before any of the three countries 
achieved independence from England, the provocation defense began as a common law doctrine 
about men defending their honor.17  Until the nineteenth century, provocation rules explicitly 
treated men and women differently.  In the domestic homicide context, the defense was limited 
to men and was only available when husbands killed after finding their wives in the act of 
adultery.18  Over time, the defense of provocation came to excuse “heat of passion” rather than 
honor.19  The defense has further evolved so that today any form of perceived infidelity or 
                                                 
17 See Bernard J. Brown, The Demise of Chance Medley and the Recognition of Provocation as a 
Defence to Murder in English Law, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 310, 312-13 (1963) (noting that killing 
during “embroilments to settle so-called ‘breaches of honour’” was excusable during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in England because of the absence of malice and the 
existence of provocation serious enough to deprive one of their self-control).  
18 See R. v. Mawgridge, (1707) 84 Eng. Rep. 1107, 1114-15 (K.B. U.K.) (including provocation 
in the adultery context for the first time).  Lord Holt CJ defined the categories of conduct for 
which provocation was available to include “when a man is taken in adultery . . . with another 
man’s wife, if the husband shall stab the adulterer, or knock out his brains, this is bare 
manslaughter: for jealousy is the rage of a man, and adultery is the highest invasion of property.”  
Id. at 1115; Ian Leader-Elliot, Passion and Insurrection in the Law of Sexual Provocation, in 
SEXING THE SUBJECT OF LAW 149, 153 (Ngaire Naffine & Rosemary J. Owens eds., LBC 
Information Services 1997) (suggesting that originally provocation based on witnessing adultery 
was only available to the husband for killing his sexual rival not his wife).  Leader-Elliot refers 
to two English cases, R. v. Pearson, (1835) 168 Eng. Rep. 1133 (U.K.) and R. v. Kelly, (1848) 
175 Eng. Rep. 342 (Monmouth Assizes U.K.), where the law allowed provocation for killing the 
unfaithful wife.  Id. at 157;  see also CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN 19 
(New York Univ. Press 2003) (describing other bases for provocation that do not involve 
domestic homicide such as aggravated assault or battery, mutual combat, commission of a 
serious crime against a close relative of the defendant and illegal arrest).  Today, provocation is 
often argued in the context of mutual combat situations such as bar brawls.  In these contexts, 
both the parties are usually male.  
19 Many provocation statutes expressly include the phrase “heat of passion.”  See, e.g., Criminal 
Code, 1913, § 281 (W. Austl.) (stating that “[w]hen a person who unlawfully kills another . . . 
does the act which causes death in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation, and before 
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attempt to leave an intimate relationship may suffice to support a “heat of passion” claim.20 
Thus, the provocation defense has continued to be specially designed for men. 
Despite the intent of the provocation defense to provide a concession to a human frailty 
that is more typically male, today the rare woman who kills out of rage and jealousy, 
theoretically, can also use the defense.21  Therefore, even though the vast majority of people who 
kill their partners or former partners out of rage, jealousy or hurt pride are men, provocation law 
now provides a version of formal equality.22  However, equality considerations under the 
provocation doctrine have not been limited solely to allowing women to assert the same heat of 
passion rationale as men.  Substantive equality has played an important role in the recent 
development of provocation doctrine.  In all three countries, the provocation defense can now be 
asserted when a person kills in an emotional state other than rage and jealousy, most notably 
fear, which is much more likely to be an emotion on which a battered woman would base her 
                                                                                                                                                             
there is time for his passion to cool, he is guilty of manslaughter only.”) (emphasis added); 
Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 232 (1974) (determining that “[c]ulpable homicide 
that otherwise would be murder may be reduced to manslaughter if the person who committed it 
did so in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation.”) (emphasis added); see also 
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.115(a) (1980) (asserting that “[i]n a prosecution [for murder], it is a 
defense that the defendant acted in a heat of passion, before there had been a reasonable 
opportunity for the passion to cool, when the heat of passion resulted from a serious provocation 
by the intended victim.”) (emphasis added). 
20 See Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 
106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1355-56 (1997). 
21 See LEE, supra note 18, at 26; see also Morgan, supra note 2, at 256 (noting that the author 
“found no reported Australian cases where women were provoked into killing men who left them 
or who ‘confessed adultery.’”).  I say “theoretically” because there is evidence that juries are less 
sympathetic to women than to men who kill intimates out of rage and jealousy.  LEE, supra note 
18, at 52.  It was not until 1946 that England acknowledged that a woman who killed her 
husband when he was engaged in adultery could use the provocation defense.  See Holmes v. 
Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, [1946] A.C. 588, 592 (U.K.).   
22 See Victoria Nourse, Upending Status: A Comment on Switching, Inequality, and the Idea of 
the Reasonable Person, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 361, 365 (2004).  See generally FORELL & 
MATTHEWS, supra note 5.   
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claim.23  Expanding provocation’s rationales to mitigate the punishment of these women, rather 
than exonerating them through self-defense, amounts to only partial progress towards full 
substantive equality.24  However, progress it is.  
Another area where substantive equality may have influenced the provocation doctrine is 
the relaxation or elimination of the traditional requirements that there was no time to cool off 
between the provocation and the killing,25 and that there was some particular triggering 
incident.26  These changes, which have been recognized in some American and many Australian 
jurisdictions,27 sometimes work in favor of battered women who kill—for example, in cases 
where a battered woman kills her batterer while he is asleep.28  However, because these changes 
are not limited to situations where a battered woman kills out of fear, they also benefit people 
who kill out of jealousy.  One of the most notorious and oft-discussed provocation cases is 
People v. Berry.29  In Berry, expanding the cooling off period under the traditional provocation 
                                                 
23 See, e.g., Van Den Hoek v. The Queen (1986) 161 C.L.R. 158, ¶ 17 (Austl.) (Mason, J.).  See 
generally Caroline Forell, Homicide and the Unreasonable Man, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 597 
(2004) (reviewing CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN 
THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM (New York Univ. Press 2003)). 
24 See infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.  
25 See LEE, supra note 18, at 44 (noting that the requirement that there be no time to cool off is 
part of the modern test for provocation except under the Model Penal Code’s extreme emotional 
disturbance test).  
26 See, e.g., Crimes Act, 1900, § 13(2)(b) (Austl. Cap. Terr.) (stating that the provoking conduct 
can have “occurred immediately before the act or omission causing death or at any previous 
time.”). 
27 See, e.g., Crimes Act, 1900, § 23(2) (N.S.W.); Crimes Act, 1900, § 13(2) (Austl. Cap. Terr.); 
see also VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 24, 52. 
28 See, e.g., R. v. Muy Ky Chhay (1994) 72 A. Crim. R. 1 (Austl.) (finding that cumulative acts 
of domestic violence could cause sufficient loss of control that a woman could be acting in self-
defense when she kills her sleeping husband); see also State v. Felton, 329 N.W.2d 161, 174 
(Wis. 1983) (holding that a long history of abuse, and provocation on day of the shooting, was 
sufficient to raise a jury question as to heat of passion despite the fact the victim was asleep 
when his wife shot him). 
29 556 P.2d 777 (Cal. 1976).  Some of the recent California cases that discuss Berry involve heat 
of passion killings where the jury was instructed on provocation, yet found that the evidence 
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test benefited a man who killed his wife in the heat of passion.30  In another case involving male 
rage and jealousy, Parker v. R.,31 the Privy Council reversed the majority decision of the 
Australian High Court, agreeing with the dissenting judges that provocation’s “no time to cool 
off” requirement be relaxed.32  Thus, these changes are not particularly good examples of 
substantive equality.  
II. The Provocation Divide 
Today, both men and women can base their provocation claim on either jealous rage or 
fear.  However, the gendered reality is that the bases for asserting the provocation defense in 
domestic homicide cases are sex-segregated.  Men almost exclusively use heat of passion based 
on jealousy while women almost exclusively use fear.  For different reasons, both male-gendered 
heat of passion and female-gendered fear are likely to continue to be allowed as justifications for 
a provocation defense in the United States, Canada and most Australian jurisdictions.  
In all three countries, approximately three-quarters of the perpetrators of domestic 
homicide are male.33  Many of these men have previously committed violence against their 
                                                                                                                                                             
supported a murder verdict.  This bolsters the argument I make later in the article, see infra notes  
89-102 and accompanying text, that even though juries are being given provocation instructions, 
they are finding that heat of passion is not a valid basis for finding provocation.  See, e.g., People 
v. Williams, No. A094710, 2003 WL 21246611 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. May 30, 2003); 
People v. Pemberton, Nos. C036700, C037010, 2002 WL 436959 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2002). 
30 See LEE, supra note 18, at 44 (noting that the cooling off period in Berry was so elastic as to 
allow a husband to claim heat of passion two weeks after learning of his wife’s infidelity); see 
also Rebecca Bradfield, Domestic Homicide and the Defence of Provocation: A Tasmanian 
Perspective on the Jealous Husband and the Battered Wife, 19 U. TAS. L. REV. 5, 13 (2000).  
Under the more modern and pro-defendant Model Penal Code the cooling off period requirement 
has been completely eliminated.  See LEE, supra note 18, at 44 (noting that had Berry arisen in a 
Model Penal Code state, no cooling off period would have been required). 
31 See (1964) A.C. 1369, rev’g (1963) 111 C.L.R. 610 (Austl.). 
32 See Parker (1964) A.C. at 1369. 
33 See CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIME 
DATA BRIEF, NCJ 197838, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, 1993-2001 (2003) [hereinafter CRIME 
DATE BRIEF], available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 
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female victims.34  Nevertheless, they are frequently permitted to use the provocation defense 
even when the female victims’ “provoking” conduct was a lawful exercise of sexual or personal 
autonomy, such as sexual intercourse with another or leaving the relationship.35  Most 
jurisdictions continue to provide this broadened version of the traditional provocation defense as 
a “concession to human frailty.”36  As this article will show, the harshness of lengthy mandatory 
minimum sentences for murder is likely the decisive reason why this trend has continued 
unabated in Canada and the United States, but not in some Australian jurisdictions where such 
determinate sentencing has been abolished.  
Women commit domestic homicide much less frequently than do men.37  When they do 
kill, they usually kill their batterers out of fear and despair.  In all three countries, battered 
women who kill routinely rely on provocation or some other basis for reducing murder to 
manslaughter38 because their often more appropriate claims of self-defense, that would result in 
                                                                                                                                                             
2005); see also ANDRÉE CÔTÉ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF WOMEN AND THE LAW, STOP EXCUSING 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1.2 (2000), available at http://www.nawl.ca/provocation.htm (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2005); Morgan, supra note 2, at 239.  Men most frequently commit homicides 
of both sexes, while the vast majority of homicide victims are male.  See, e.g., JOHN KAPLAN ET 
AL., CRIMINAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 388-89 (Aspen Publishers 2000) (1986); JENNY 
MOUZOS, 2003-2004 NAT’L HOMICIDE MONITORING PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT, HOMICIDE IN 
AUSTRALIA 11, 17 (2004). 
34 See CÔTÉ ET AL., supra note 33, at 1.2 (noting that one third of women killed by their spouses 
in Ontario had previously reported domestic violence to the police, and that if unreported cases 
were included, a large majority of cases of spousal homicide would be preceded by male 
violence). 
35 See Nourse, supra note 20, at 1407-08. 
36 VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 23 (citing R. v. Kirkham, (1837) 173 Eng. 
Rep. 422, 424 (U.K.)); see also Parker (1963) 111 C.L.R. at 652 (quoting East’s Pleas of the 
Crown (1803) vol. 1, 238) (stating to have received “such a provocation as the law presumes 
might in human frailty heat the blood to a proportionable degree of resentment, and keep it 
boiling to the moment of the fact.”). 
37 See CRIME DATA BRIEF, supra note 33. 
38 For example, in Australia, battered women who kill may also argue lack of intent to kill, 
diminished responsibility and excessive self-defense.  See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, 
supra note 6, at 97-98; FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 5, at 164; Rebecca Bradfield, The 
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acquittal, fail.39  Thus, provocation is usually viewed as a backup defense for battered women.  
Battered women’s self-defense claims too frequently fail because, like provocation, self-
defense was designed with men’s conduct in mind.  Self-defense is based on a “male code of 
combat.”40  Thus, when a battered woman uses a gun or knife to kill her unarmed batterer, or 
kills him when he is asleep or otherwise unaware of her attack, a judge may decline to give a 
self-defense jury instruction because the defendant’s conduct fails to fit the requirements of the 
jurisdiction’s self-defense rule.  Similarly, if a judge gives a self-defense instruction to a jury, the 
jury may find that the defendant’s conduct does not meet the requirements of the rule.  Even if a 
battered woman’s conduct does fit within the jurisdiction’s self-defense rule, a jury may decide 
that her deadly response was not justified under current social norms.41  As one commentator 
notes: 
The continued association of self-defence with a . . . confrontation will continue 
to make it difficult for jurors to identify actions taken in self-protection as ‘self-
defence’ outside this context.  This may particularly disadvantage those 
responding to an ongoing threat of harm, rather than a single attack or threat of 
violence, and those who kill in non-confrontational circumstances. 
 
. . .[In the context of family violence] where a person’s actions have been carried 
out in fear for their lives and under a belief there is no alternative, self-defence 
should not be excluded simply because he or she killed in non-confrontational 
circumstances or in response to an ongoing threat of violence, rather than an 
immediate attack.42 
                                                                                                                                                             
Treatment of Women Who Kill Their Male Partners Within the Australian Criminal Justice 
System 104-08 (2002) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Tasmania) (on file with the 
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law). 
39 See R. v. M., [1998] D.L.R. (4th) 513 (Can.) (L’Heureux-Dubé, J., concurring); ELIZABETH  
M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 118-20 (Yale Univ. Press 2000). 
40 See FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 5, at 201; see also REGINA GRAYCAR & JENNY 
MORGAN, THE HIDDEN GENDER OF LAW 438-40 (2d ed., The Federation Press 2002).  
41 See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 83; see also FORELL & MATTHEWS, 
supra note 5, at 216-17. 
42 VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 68; see FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 
5, at 201-02; see also Osland v. R. (1998) 197 C.L.R. 316, 375-76 (Austl.) (footnotes omitted) 
(expressing concerns among both laypeople and those that are legally trained that too liberal a 
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Rebecca Bradfield’s study of sixty-five Australian Supreme Court cases43 where battered 
women killed their husbands over the period between 1980 and 2000 illustrates the difficulties in 
obtaining a self-defense verdict. Of the twenty-one cases where battered women raised self-
defense, only nine were acquitted, while eleven were convicted of manslaughter and one of 
murder.44  Obviously, a successful provocation claim, while perhaps not providing a battered 
woman with complete justice, will often provide a fairer result than a finding of murder.  
Bradfield’s study further demonstrates the importance of provocation to battered women.  
In all twenty-two cases where a battered woman claimed provocation at trial, she was 
successful.45 The provocation defense, therefore, provided battered women an important fallback 
option.  This was not true for men who claimed provocation.46 Men received a manslaughter 
verdict in only eight out of fifteen cases where provocation based on jealous rage was argued at 
trial.47  
                                                                                                                                                             
self-defense rule would allow battered women to engage in violent self-help).  Justice Kirby of 
the Australian High Court held: 
No civilised society removes its protection to human life simply because of the 
existence of a history of long-term physical or psychological abuse.  If it were so, 
it would expose to unsanctioned homicide a large number of persons who, in the 
nature of things, would not be able to give their version of the facts.  The law 
expects a greater measure of self-control in unwanted situations where human life 
is at stake.  It reserves cases of provocation and self-defence to truly exceptional 
circumstances.  Whilst these circumstances may be affected by contemporary 
conditions and attitudes, there is no legal carte blanche, including for people in 
abusive relationships, to engage in premeditated homicide.  Nor in my view 
should there be.   
Id. at 375. 
43 Supreme Courts are the highest state appellate courts in Australia. See 
http://www.nla.gov.au/oz/law.html.  
44 See id. 
45 See id. at 144-45.  Bradfield also notes that in sixty-five out of seventy-six cases where a 
woman killed her husband or ex-husband, there was a history of physical violence.  Id. at 22. 
46 See id. at 145. 
47 See id.; see also Elizabeth Sheehy, Battered Women and Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 39 
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Although imperfect, the provocation defense makes manslaughter, which carries a 
substantially shorter sentence than murder, a viable outcome for battered women.  This presents 
a dilemma for those who seek to reform criminal law to ensure that battered women who kill are 
treated justly, while at the same time eliminating the jealous heat of passion basis for a 
manslaughter verdict.  What happens to battered women if provocation is abolished and therefore 
no longer available to them?  One possibility is that acquittal based on a successful self-defense 
claim will replace it as the most common outcome.  Another possibility is that other defenses 
such as diminished capacity will take up the slack for provocation.  However, another possibility 
is the substantial increase in murder convictions. 
Men’s heat of passion and women’s fear are both likely to continue to be allowed as 
bases for provocation in most jurisdictions because lengthy mandatory minimum sentences for 
murder are deemed too harsh.  These mandatory sentences, along with the frequent failure of 
self-defense claims when battered women kill out of fear, make a manslaughter option 
necessary.48  However, permitting both heat of passion and fear as bases for a provocation 
defense may be less problematic than it first appears.  There is intriguing evidence that even in 
Canada and the United States, where the goal of substantive gender equality has had little effect 
on the law of provocation, the feminist critiques of the past thirty years have combined with 
changing social values to influence the application of the provocation defense by prosecutors, 
judges, and juries.  As this article will show, evolving community assessments of violence 
arising out of possessiveness and violence resulting from fear may frequently be resulting in 
                                                                                                                                                             
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 529, 531 (2001) (noting that “none [of the many strategies to reform self 
defense] can be credited with achieving any marked increase in acquittals for battered women on 
trial.”). 
48 See Bradfield, supra note 38, at 108-28 (contending that lack of intent is the most frequent 
basis for domestic homicide manslaughter conviction for women). 
 13
substantive gender equality under provocation and other criminal law rules that were created 
with men in mind.  
III. Differences and Similarities among the Three Countries 
Certain commonalities exist that may be relevant to how provocation claims are treated.  
All three nations have their legal roots in English common law and have constitutions creating 
federal systems that divide government between the centralized national government and states 
or provinces.  As a result, a variety of different jurisdictions within each country make and apply 
criminal law, including the provocation defense.  In all three countries, feminist legal scholars, 
lawyers and jurists have vigorously critiqued the traditional provocation doctrine,49 and thus, 
helped shape both current provocation law and social norms concerning violence based on 
jealousy and violence based on fear.  
Differences among the three legal systems may affect their provocation rules.  While 
Canada has one federal provocation statute for the entire nation, separate provocation rules exist 
in each of the fifty American states and eight Australian states and territories.  As a result, in the 
United States and Canada there is an opportunity for concurrently developing different legal 
                                                 
49 See, e.g., CÔTÉ ET AL, supra note 33 (writing in the United States); FORELL & MATTHEWS, 
supra note 5, at 196; Adrian Howe, Provoking Comment: The Question of Gender Bias in the 
Provocation Defence—A Victorian Case Study, in AUSTRALIAN WOMEN: CONTEMPORARY 
FEMINIST THOUGHT 230-31 (Norma Grieve and Ailsa Burns eds., 1994) (writing in Australia); 
LEE, supra note 18, at 276-78; STANLEY M.H. YEO, UNRESTRAINED KILLINGS AND THE LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE LAWS OF PROVOCATION AND EXCESSIVE SELF-DEFENSE IN 
INDIA, ENGLAND, AND AUSTRALIA 182-83 (Rajeev Dhavan et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1998); 
Bradfield, supra, note 30, at 5; Wayne Gorman, Provocation: The Jealous Husband Defence, 42 
CRIM. L. Q. 478, 499-500 (1999) (writing in Canada); Edward M. Hyland, R. v. Thibert: Are 
There Any Ordinary People Left, 28 OTTAWA L. REV. 145, 168-69 (1997); Morgan, supra note 2; 
Nourse, supra note 20, at 1339-42; Gary T. Trotter, Anger, Provocation, and the Intent for 
Murder, 47 MCGILL L.J. 669, 688 (2002). 
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rules concerning domestic homicide.50  Furthermore, as courts of final review of state criminal 
cases, Australia’s and Canada’s highest federal courts have decided a number of provocation 
cases, providing guidance on the issue at a national level.  In contrast, the United States Supreme 
Court lacks jurisdiction to review homicide cases concerning provocation because provocation 
typically does not involve a constitutional or federal issue.51  Because criminal law is an area 
traditionally reserved to the states, in the United States there is little judicial guidance concerning 
provocation doctrine from federal courts. 
A potentially important difference when it comes to gender and equality analysis is the 
gender make-up of the judiciary, especially the highest appellate court.52  Even when, as in the 
United States, the highest federal court does not review provocation cases, the Court’s views on 
gender equality influence other legal decision-makers.  The women who have been on the bench 
have often been staunch proponents of gender equality and, therefore, their presence may make a 
difference in how equality analysis applies to gender discrimination and evolves over time.53  
                                                 
50 In the United States, there are two sets of “heat of passion” rules: traditional provocation rules 
and the Model Penal Code’s Extreme Emotional Disturbance provision.  See infra Part IV.  In 
Australia there are at least four different ways that states deal with provocation.  See infra Part 
VI. 
51 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (noting the power of Supreme Court and other federal courts to 
adjudicate constitutional and federal claims; claims between states; claims between a state and 
citizens of another state; claims between citizens of different states; and claims between a state 
or its citizens and foreign governments or their citizens).  But see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 
684 (1975) (holding that due process mandates that the prosecution bear the burden of proving 
the absence of provocation). 
52 See generally Fred O. Smith, Note, Gendered Justice: Do Male and Female Judges Rule 
Differently on Questions of Gay Rights?, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 2087, 2090-97 (2005). 
53 Female Justices have played major roles in cases that favor women’s rights.  See, e.g., Jackson 
v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 125 S. Ct. 1497, 1509-10 (2005) (upholding a suit for retaliation 
under Title IX,  where Justice Ginsburg joined Justice O’Connor’s five to four opinion allowing 
a male coach to sue after he was allegedly fired for complaining about sex discrimination against 
his public high school female basketball team); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557 
(1996)  (shifting the line between intermediate scrutiny for gender and strict scrutiny for race in 
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion requiring an all-male state military school to admit women); 
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The gender make-up of the highest courts in Australia, Canada and the United States is 
quite different.  While the Australian High Court has previously included one female member,54 
currently there are none.55  At present, the United States Supreme Court includes only one 
female member, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. She is one of America’s leading proponents of 
feminist formal equality that focuses on eliminating gender stereotypes.56  
The membership of the Canadian Supreme Court differs significantly from the Australian 
High Court and the United States Supreme Court.  Currently it has four female members, 
including the Chief Justice.57  Furthermore, up until Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé’s retirement 
in 2002, she was a highly influential judicial proponent of substantive equality.58  The difference 
in representation of women on each nation’s highest court is consistent with the differences in 
                                                                                                                                                             
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22, 25 (1993) (exemplifying Justice O’Connor and 
Justice Ginsburg’s commitment in advancing women’s interests in the area of sexual 
harassment); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (showing Justice 
O’Connor’s influence in preserving the right to abortion by upholding Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973)); see also Diana Majury, The Charter, Equality Rights, and Women: Equivocation 
and Celebration, 40 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 297, 312-13 (2002) (recounting female judges making 
a difference in Canadian equality analysis).  See generally Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female 
Judges Do Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 
YALE L.J. 1759 (2005) (finding that female judges mattered to outcomes in Title VII sexual 
harassment and sex discrimination cases). 
54 Justice Mary Gaudron was the only female justice sitting on the Australian High Court.  See 
generally Osland v. R. (1998) 197 C.L.R. 316 (Austl.) (Gaudron, J.) (expounding on provocation 
and battered women).  
55 See Rachel Davis & George Williams, A Century of Appointments but Only One Woman, 28 
ALTERNATIVE L.J. 54, 54 (2003) (noting that since Justice Mary Gaudron’s retirement in 2003, 
no other women have joined the court). 
56 See Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 829-31 (1990); 
see also Kathryn A. Lee, Note, Intermediate Review “With Teeth” in Gender Discrimination 
Cases: The New Standard in United States v. Virginia, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 221, 
225, n.35 (1997). Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the first woman appointed to the United States 
Supreme Court, submitted her resignation in 2005 and was replaced by Justice Samuel Alito in 
February 2006.  
57 The nine current Justices of the Canadian Supreme Court include the following female 
justices: Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin, Justice Marie Deschamps, Justice Rosalie Abella and 
Justice Louise Charron. 
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overall representation of women as senior judges in the three countries.  In 2003, only 14.6% of 
the Australian senior judiciary was female59 while women represented 24% of the U.S. federal 
judiciary in 200560 and 26% of the Canadian appellate bench in 1999.61  
The three countries also differ on how constitutional law treats gender equality.  
Although the different impact that the provocation defense has on women and men is not likely 
to be considered a constitutional equality issue,62 it is useful to consider the amount of protection 
the federal constitutions provide for women because this may influence how gender equality is 
viewed in non-constitutional law areas such as the provocation defense.  Neither the United 
States nor Australian Constitutions expressly provide for equality of the sexes.  However, even 
though it includes no reference to sex equality, the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment 
Equal Protection Clause63 has been interpreted to require close scrutiny of cases in which the 
government discriminates based on gender.64  Under the U.S. Constitution, gender equality is 
formal.65  Thus, only when men and women are not viewed as similarly situated is sex 
discrimination permissible.66 Unlike either the United States or Canada, Australia’s Constitution 
                                                                                                                                                             
58 See Majury, supra note 53, at 311. 
59 See Davis & Williams, supra note 55, at 56.  
60 See FEMINIST MAJORITY FOUND., WOMEN STILL UNDERREPRESENTED ON THE FEDERAL BENCH, 
July 5, 2005, http://www.feminist.org/news/newsbyte/printnews.asp?id=9138 (citing the New 
York Times). 
61 See Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, Outsiders on the Bench: The Continuing Struggle for Equality, 
16 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 15, 16-17 (2001).  
62 See CÔTÉ ET AL., supra note 33, at 1.2 (indicating that at least one set of Canadian feminist 
commentators, on behalf of Canada’s National Association of Women and the Law, has 
proposed that the provocation defense, as it now exists in Canada, violates the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms sex equality provision). 
63 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (declaring that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
64 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996). 
65 See, e.g., KATHERINE BARTLETT ET AL., GENDER AND THE LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, 
COMMENTARY 117-18 (3d. Ed. 2002). 
66 See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 (1974).  On at least one occasion, Congress has 
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has neither an equal protection clause nor any other provision that has been used to address 
gender inequality.  As a result, Australia has neither formal nor substantive constitutional gender 
equality jurisprudence.67 
Canada, under its 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms, treats gender equality quite 
differently from Australia and the United States.68  The Charter explicitly provides for sex 
equality free from government discrimination.69  This has been interpreted to mean substantive 
equality70 based on equal human dignity and full membership in society.71  Retired Supreme 
Court Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé describes Canada’s equality provision “as combining the 
                                                                                                                                                             
stepped in to provide substantive equality concerning pregnancy when the Supreme Court had 
insisted on formal equality.  See, e.g., Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000(e)(k) (current through P.L. 109-65 (excluding P.L. 109-59) approved Sept. 20, 2005) 
(legislation pending) (rejecting the Supreme Court’s holding in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 
U.S. 125 (1976), that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not sex discrimination under 
Title VII); see also Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 476 (1981) 
(allowing for gender distinctions in a statutory rape statute because women and men bear 
different burdens in sexual intercourse and pregnancy). 
67 See SURI RATNAPALA, AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: FOUNDATIONS AND THEORY 274 
(Trischa Baker ed., 2002); see also GRAYCAR & MORGAN, supra note 40, at 211 (concluding that 
lack of any federal constitutional gender equality doctrine and stating that “[i]n Australia, 
because of the absence of a constitutional right to ‘equality’, it is not easy and probably not even 
possible to present an equality argument to a court in the context of, say, a criminal prosecution 
of a doctor for performing an abortion.”). The federal Sex Discrimination Act of 1984 provides 
the primary protection against discrimination on the basis of sex.  This Act has been described as 
taking “a formal equality approach.”  See GRAYCAR & MORGAN, supra note 40, at 28-29 
(quoting the examination of deficiencies in formal equality or gender neutral treatment from 
AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, FINAL REPORT 69, EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW: WOMEN’S 
EQUALITY, Part II 3.9 (1994). 
68 See Constitution Act, 1982, 79 enacted as Schedule B, Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 15(1) 
(U.K.). 
69 See id. 
70 See Majury, supra note 53, at 305 (stating that: “equality writing accepts that substantive 
equality is the operative model in Canadian law.”). 
71 See Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 15(1) (declaring that “[e]very individual is equal before and 
under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without 
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, 
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.”) (emphasis added); see also id. § 28 
(stating, “[n]otwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights and freedoms referred to in it are 
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[United States Constitution’s] Equal Protection Clause . . . and an equal rights amendment.”72  
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, who helped shape Canada’s constitutional jurisprudence from a 
substantive equality perspective, emphasizes how different Canada’s provision demanding 
“equality without discrimination” is from the same-as-men formulation that is the prevailing 
equality analysis in Australia and the United States.73  
Canada’s embrace of substantive equality and its high percentage of female appellate 
judges led me originally to predict that Canada would treat any issue where the victims are 
overwhelmingly female and the perpetrators overwhelmingly male as meriting a substantive 
equality analysis. If not, I at least expected that Canada’s law would be more feminist and 
protective of women’s rights and interests than Australia or the United States.  Therefore, I 
expected that traditional provocation doctrine, which so clearly favors male rage and jealousy 
over other emotions, would have been found to be a form of gender discrimination that needed to 
be either substantially revised or abolished, especially since Canadian courts have held that the 
values set out in the Charter should influence how statutes and the common law are interpreted.74  
However, this has not been the Canadian experience with provocation law even though Charter-
based substantive equality arguments have been made.75  Instead, Canada, much of Australia and 
                                                                                                                                                             
guaranteed equally to male and female persons.”). 
72 L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 61, at 20.  
73 See id.  
74 See Cloutier v. Langlois, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158 at 184.  The Canadian Supreme Court stated: 
Though the parties have not relied on the Charter, and have simply referred to the 
common law sources in examining the scope of the power to search, I feel that the 
courts should “apply and develop the principles of the common law in a manner 
consistent with the fundamental values enshrined in the Constitution.” 
Id. (quoting Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union, Loc. 580 v. Dolphin Delivery, Ltd., [1986] 
2 S.C.R. at 603); see also Dir. of Family and Children’s Servs. v. E.I., [2005] YKSC 4, ¶ 47 
(explaining that “statutory interpretation can and should be done in a manner consistent with the 
fundamental values enshrined in the Charter.”).  
75 See CÔTÉ ET AL., supra note 33, at 1.2 (noting that the primary beneficiaries of the expanded 
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the slim majority of American states that do not apply the Model Penal Code’s extreme 
emotional disturbance test that is even more solicitous of male rage and jealousy,76 have similar 
traditional provocation rules.77  
Notably, however, two Australian states have completely rejected this traditional 
approach: Tasmania, where the provocation defense was abolished in 2003,78 and Victoria, 
where the provocation defense was abolished in November 2005.79  Both jurisdictions’ 
explanations for abolition highlight the decisive impact that elimination of statutorily imposed 
limits on judges’ sentencing discretion can have on the retention of a provocation rule.   
In the next three sections, I examine in detail how provocation is treated in the United 
States, Canada and Australia.  I conclude that the preference for formal or substantive equality in 
a jurisdiction’s constitutional jurisprudence seems to have no influence on its provocation rules.  
Instead, the differing amounts of judicial sentencing discretion in each jurisdiction provide the 
greatest influence on how fully substantive equality is incorporated into a jurisdiction’s handling 
of the provocation defense.  In particular, I demonstrate that presence or absence of mandatory 
minimum sentencing, especially regarding murder, has been highly influential in shaping each 
country’s provocation rules.   
 IV. United States Provocation Law 
Because of the severe limitations on judicial discretion concerning sentencing, the United 
                                                                                                                                                             
provocation defense in Canada have been men, sometimes allowing them to “get away with 
murder.”).  
76 See LEE, supra note 18, at 34-39 (describing this male-biased code as allowing mitigation 
whenever a defendant can show he is suffering from extreme emotional distress at the time of the 
homicide).  But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (2004).   
77 See Forell, supra note 23, at 608-09. 
78 See Criminal Code Act, 1924, § 160 (Tas.) amended by Criminal Code Amendment (Abolition 
of Defence of Provocation) Act, 2003 (Tas.) (removing §160, which contained the defense of 
provocation, from the Criminal Code). 
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States presents a bleak picture regarding incorporating substantive equality into its provocation 
doctrine.80  Currently, for violent crimes such as manslaughter and murder, all fifty American 
states have some form of determinate sentencing, most frequently mandatory minimum 
sentences and sentencing guidelines.81 This often gives American trial judges substantially less 
room to factor in circumstances using their own discretion than exists in Australia or Canada.  
American juries (through more gradations in crime such as manslaughter, degrees of murder, 
and, in certain cases, application of the death penalty), prosecutors (through deciding what crime 
to charge) and legislatures (through mandatory minimum sentences, sentencing grids and 
sentencing guidelines),82 determine the length of time a convicted murderer will serve instead of 
trial judges.  
Most American trial judges have little or no discretion to provide for a suspended or short 
murder sentence.83  This may explain why American legal commentators are highly critical of 
                                                                                                                                                             
79 See Crimes (Homicide) Act, 2005, No. 77/2005, § 3B (Austrl.) (amending Crimes Act, 1958).   
80 But see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (calling into question the 
constitutionality of mandatory sentencing guidelines); State v. Barker, 692 N.W.2d 755, 761 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (demonstrating the way mandatory minimum sentences and sentencing 
guidelines have been under sustained attack for years).  It was further noted that they finally 
appear vulnerable.  Id. 
81 See Ben Trachtenberg, State Sentencing Policy and New Prison Admissions, 38 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 479, 487 (2005).  
82 See, e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 17-10-6.1 (2005) (providing that “no portion of the mandatory 
minimum sentence imposed shall be suspended, stayed, probated, deferred, or withheld by the 
sentencing court.”).  This statute, which includes murder and felony murder, is known as 
Georgia’s “Seven Deadly Sins” statute.  Id.; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 137.700 (stating, “the 
court shall impose, and the person shall serve, at least the entire term of imprisonment”).  The 
statute provides for a minimum sentence of three hundred months (twenty-five years) for murder 
and one hundred and twenty months (ten years) for manslaughter.  Id.  However, there are 
certain specific exceptions under OR. REV. STAT. § 137.712 (2003). 
83 Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1467, 1476 n.28 
(2001); see also Bill Bishop, Man Who Killed Former Lover Gets Life, EUGENE REG. GUARD, 
Feb. 4, 2005, at C3 (demonstrating that a trial judge’s lack of discretion can lead to desired 
outcomes).  In this case, an Oregon man who brutally killed his ex-girlfriend for breaking off her 
relationship with him received a mandatory minimum twenty-five year term after he was 
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current provocation rules, yet fail to urge that provocation be abolished entirely.84  Abolition is 
too risky and punitive for battered women who kill, and perhaps, even for homicides committed 
out of rage and jealousy. 
Nevertheless, questions remain concerning why two sets of provocation rules that permit 
male-bias are so firmly entrenched in the United States.  Despite widespread criticism of these 
existing rules, traditional provocation,85 and the even more lenient Model Penal Code’s (“MPC”) 
extreme emotional disturbance rules (“EED”),86 are still available to men who kill women who 
seek to exercise their autonomy through infidelity or leaving.87  Formal equality allows the rare 
woman who kills for the same reasons as men to rely on these rules, as well.  Substantive 
equality is limited to allowing other emotions besides rage and jealousy to be considered.  
Particularly troubling for achieving meaningful substantive equality for women is the 
                                                                                                                                                             
convicted of murder by the jury.  Id.    
84 See, e.g., LEE, supra note 18, at 217-25 (recommending gender switching as a device to enable 
juries to recognize their own prejudices); Nourse, supra note 20, at 1395-97 (recommending that 
provocation not be allowed when the conduct was lawful); see also Joshua Dressler, Why Keep 
the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on a Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959, 963 
(2001-02) (recommending modifications to the existing provocation doctrine). 
85 See State v. Viera, 787 A.2d 256, 264 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (listing the four 
elements of a typical non-MPC provocation rule: (1) the provocation must be adequate; (2) the 
defendant must not have had time to cool off between the provocation and the slaying; (3) the 
provocation must have actually impassioned the defendant; and (4) the defendant must not have 
actually cooled off before the slaying); see also LEE, supra note 18, at 25 (describing the 
elements of a modern provocation defense as: “(1) the defendant was actually provoked into a 
heat of passion, (2) the reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes would have been so provoked, 
(3) the defendant did not cool off, and (4) the reasonable person in defendant’s shoes would not 
have cooled off.”).    
86 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962) (requiring that the jury find that the killer acted: 
“under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable 
explanation or excuse.  The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined 
from the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation under the circumstances as he believes 
them to be.”).   
87 See Nourse, supra note 20, at 1349.  
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widespread enactment of the MPC, first adopted by the American Law Institute in 1962.88  The 
highly subjective EED provision predates the dramatic switch from indeterminate judge-based 
sentencing to legislatively mandate determinate sentencing and the social and legal revolution 
concerning the rights of women, both of which occurred in the 1970s.  The shift to mandatory 
sentencing pushes in the direction of allowing the EED’s subjectivity in order that more 
defendants can avoid the draconian sentences for murder.  In contrast, social norms and the goal 
of substantive gender equality make the EED’s similar treatment of battered women who kill and 
domestic homicides based on jealous rage seem unjust.  The MPC authors’ failure to factor in 
how EED impacts women is reflected in the commentaries to the MPC, issued in 1980, which 
contain not a hint of concern about its effect on homicides involving infidelity, separation or 
domestic violence.89  
In addition to determinate sentencing, there may be another reason for American law’s 
extreme willingness to allow juries to partially excuse men who kill out of jealousy and rage. 
Compared to Australia or Canada, Americans have a greater distrust of government and value 
individual over group rights.  As Paul Marcus and Vicki Waye observe in an article comparing 
Australia’s and America’s criminal justice systems, these different values have led to a much 
stronger attachment in the United States to the jury system.90  They note:  
                                                 
88 See LEE, supra note 18, at 33 (stating some form of this provision is in effect in almost half the 
states).   
89 See MODEL PENAL CODE §210.3 cmts. at 44-65 (1980). 
90 See Paul Marcus and Vicki Waye, Australia and the United States: Two Common Criminal 
Justice Systems Uncommonly at Odds, 12 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 27, 96-97 (2004) (noting that 
while Australia and the United States both use the jury system, the United States views the jury 
as guaranteeing transparency and accountability while Australia does not view the jury as so 
fundamental to the democratic process); see also NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMM’N, 
supra note 2, at 3.133.  
The jury has traditionally been and remains the appropriate arbiter of community 
values.  To remove fundamental issues of culpability from the jury and to pass 
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From independence, the American jury has been seen as a political weapon.  . . .  
[In contrast], [a]lthough the jury is also valued in Australia by accused persons for 
peer empathy, it is not so highly valued as an essential component of the 
democratic system.  Except for the most serious criminal cases, jury trials are 
rare.91  
 
Similar distinctions can be drawn between Canada and the United States.92  
This stronger attachment to letting the jury decide the seriousness of the crime might 
make it difficult for Americans to give up the provocation defense altogether.  Even if mandatory 
minimum sentencing eventually is rejected and, therefore, judges are allowed to tailor sentences 
to make them longer or shorter than currently permitted, the provocation defense may not 
disappear.  Provocation is a classic jury question, one where the jury is asked to determine what 
the ordinary person would do under the circumstances.  Abolishing provocation would leave this 
decision solely to a judge’s discretion in sentencing.  Considering the sharp swing away from 
broad judicial sentencing discretion, which was the norm up until the 1970s, to highly restricted 
judicial discretion today, it is hard to imagine American jurisdictions returning to unfettered 
judicial discretion while also abolishing provocation.93 
V. Canadian Provocation Law 
                                                                                                                                                             
them on to the sentencing judge undermines its role.  In addition, a jury finding of 
manslaughter enables the public to understand why a seemingly lenient sentence 
has been proposed.  It therefore aids community understanding of the law. 
Id.; VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 37-38 (explaining that, in Australia, 
concern about loss of jury involvement was one of the more compelling objections made to the 
abolition of provocation in Victoria because juries reflect “community values and standards” 
which promotes “community confidence in the justice system” and that abolition “would place 
too much power in the hands of judges”).  But see Criminal Code Amendment (Abolition of 
Defence of Provocation) Bill 2003(No. 15): Parliamentary Debates Before the Tasmanian House 
of Assembly, 59-74 (Mar. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Remarks on Criminal Code Amendment Bill] 
(failing to mention concern about the roles of juries and judges in the discussion in Parliament 
before it unanimously abolished provocation). 
91 See Marcus & Waye, supra note 90, at 97.  
92 See generally Neil Vidmar, Pretrial Prejudice in Canada: A Comparative Perspective on the 
Criminal Jury, 79 JUDICATURE 249 (1996).  
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 Even though Canada’s constitutional jurisprudence embraces substantive equality and its 
case law urges that non-constitutional issues be determined “in a manner consistent with the 
fundamental values enshrined in the Constitution,”94 the law of provocation has remained 
distinctly traditional and masculine.  Unlike Australia and the United States, Canada has a single 
nationwide provocation statute.95  Therefore, there is no room for experimentation with different 
provocation rules in different provinces.  The federal statute’s language, includes both the term 
“heat of passion” and a “no time to cool off” requirement.96  It has been interpreted much like 
provocation law in the United States.  In other words, it empathizes with men who commit 
domestic homicides in the heat of passion.  
It is important to note that in Canada, murder carries a mandatory life sentence with the 
possibility of parole after twenty-five years for first degree and after ten years for second 
degree.97  There is a four-year mandatory minimum sentence for manslaughter using a firearm98 
                                                                                                                                                             
93 See Trachtenberg, supra note 81, at 484. 
94 Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union, Loc. 580 v. Dolphin Delivery, Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 
573, 603. 
95 Can. Crim. Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 232 (1985). 
96 See id.  The statute provides that: 
(1) Culpable homicide that otherwise would be murder may be reduced to 
manslaughter if the person who committed it did so in the heat of passion caused 
by sudden provocation. 
(2) A wrongful act or an insult that is of such a nature as to be sufficient to 
deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control is provocation for the 
purposes of this section if the accused acted on it on the sudden and before there 
was time for his passion to cool. 
(3) For the purposes of this section, the questions (a) whether a particular 
wrongful act or insult amounted to provocation, and (b) whether the accused was 
deprived of the power of self-control by the provocation that he alleges he 
received, are questions of fact, but no one shall be deemed to have given 
provocation to another by doing anything that he had a legal right to do. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
97 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE CANADA, A CRIME VICTIM’S GUIDE TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 
LIFE SENTENCES AND SECTION 745.6 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE (2003), http://canada.justice.gc.ca/ 
en/ps/voc/guide/sec_m.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2005); see also Sheehy, supra note 47, at 530. 
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and no minimum for other methods of killing.99  Thus, like many American jurisdictions,100 the 
sentencing differences between manslaughter and murder are extreme.101  As a consequence, 
complete abolition of provocation would result in lengthy murder sentences for both battered 
women who kill out of fear and men who kill in the heat of passion who could otherwise, 
through a manslaughter conviction, have a much shorter sentence, subject to greater judicial 
discretion.  Even feminist critics of Canada’s provocation defense, such as the National 
Association of Women and the Law, only recommend abolition of provocation if mandatory 
minimum sentences for murder are also abolished.102 
 While it is understandable that, due to mandatory minimum sentencing, abolition of 
provocation is currently unthinkable in Canada, it is disturbing that the Canadian Supreme Court 
has continued to excuse male rage and jealousy by retaining its expansive reading of heat of 
passion to cover situations well beyond those called for by the statute’s language.  In 1941, the 
Canadian Supreme Court, faced with a statute similar to the one that is in effect today, expanded 
provocation to include a situation where a husband was told of his wife’s infidelity and her desire 
to leave him.103  This expansion was in line with how courts in other common law countries were  
then treating the defense of provocation.  More troubling is the post-Charter, 1996 decision, R. v. 
                                                                                                                                                             
98 See Can. Crim. Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 236(a). 
99 See id. at §236(b). 
100 See, e.g., Conn. Stat. Ann. §§53a-35a (2) (mandatory minimum of twenty-five years for 
murder); §§53a-35a (4) (mandatory minimum of five years for first-degree manslaughter with a 
firearm); §§53a-35a (5) (mandatory minimum of one year for first-degree manslaughter without 
a firearm). 
101 See Can. Crim. Code, R.S.C., ch. C 46, § 718.2(a)(ii) (1996) (embodying feminist sentencing 
provisions by requiring courts, when sentencing, to consider abuse of “the offender’s spouse or 
common-law partner or child” to be an aggravating factor in domestic homicide cases).  
102 See, e.g., CÔTÉ ET AL., supra note 33, at § 3; accord Gorman, supra note 49, at 479 (stating 
that “[i]f the mandatory sentence for murder did not exist, the defence of provocation would 
disappear.  The outdated thinking found in R. v. Thibert would simply be reflected in 
sentencing.”).  
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Thibert.104  The Thibert facts closely resemble those of the 1990 Australian High Court decision 
Stingel, discussed in the next section.105  Both courts applied very similar traditional versions of 
provocation law yet reached different outcomes.106  
 In Thibert the defendant stalked his estranged wife and tried to corner her in her 
workplace parking lot.107  When her boyfriend intervened, saying, “Come on big fellow, shoot 
me,”108 the defendant shot and killed the man.109  The Canadian Supreme Court required that the 
ordinary person “be of the same age, and sex, and share with the accused such other factors as 
would give the act or insult in question a special significance.”110  Thus, the Thibert test is quite 
subjective, allowing an unlimited number of individual factors to be considered on the issue of 
how the ordinary person would respond.111  
 The Thibert Court viewed marital status and gender as relevant individual factors.  It 
therefore stated that the standard was “an ordinary person who was a married man, faced with 
                                                                                                                                                             
103 See R. v. Krawchuk, [1941] D.L.R. 353, 358-59 (Can.). 
104 [1996] S.C.R. 37 (Can.); see Trotter, supra note 49, at 671 (describing Thibert as “a highly 
questionable claim of provocation in a spousal homicide case.”). 
105 See infra notes 122-132 and accompanying text.  
106 See Criminal Code Act, 1924, §160 (Tas.) amended by Criminal Code Amendment (Abolition 
of Defence of Provocation) Act, 2003 (Tas.) (embodying the provocation statute current when 
Stingel was decided).  The statute provided:   
Any wrongful act or insult of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an 
ordinary person of the power of self-control, and which, in fact, deprives the 
offender of the power of self-control, is provocation, if the offender acts upon it 
on the sudden, and before there has been time for his passion to cool.   
Id.  
107 See Thibert, S.C.R. at 52. 
108 See id. at 53. 
109 See id.  
110 See id. at 49. 
111 See NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 2, at 3.121 (highlighting that 
unlike in Australia, “Canadian law does not require the provocation to be sufficient to make the 
ordinary person act as the accused did—it is sufficient that the loss of self control be caused by 
the provocation.”) (emphasis in the original).  The Commission also noted that Canada did not 
require proportionality while Australia did.  Id. 
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the break-up of his marriage.”112  The Court further observed, “there is no doubt that the 
relationship of the wife of the accused with the deceased was the dominating factor in the tragic 
killing.”113  Therefore, it held that the murder conviction must be reversed because a provocation 
instruction was required.114 
Canada’s provocation statute did not mandate this outcome; its ordinary person test’s 
language is strictly objective.  In particular, it is disturbing that the Court found the statutory 
language that says that provocation cannot be based on something someone has a legal right to 
do, did not mean what it said.  Acknowledging that “the actions of the deceased . . . were clearly 
not prohibited by law,” the Thibert Court still held that, because the deceased’s actions could be 
found to be insulting, the law might not approve of them, and therefore, the jury could find the 
deceased had no “legal right” to insult the defendant.115  However, as the dissent noted, “no one 
has either an emotional or proprietary right or interest in a spouse that would justify the loss of 
self-control that the [defendant] exhibited.”116  
The Thibert Court did not consider whether substantive equality was satisfied when it held 
that provocation could be asserted in this case of killing out of rage and jealousy.117  The 
                                                 
112 See Thibert, S.C.R. at 52. 
113 See id. at 50. 
114 See id. at 55-56. 
115 See id. at 55. 
116 See id. at 65 (McClung, J.A., dissenting); cf. Nourse, supra note 20, at 1394-97 (proposing 
that provocation only be available for “warranted excuse,” where law or social norms deem the 
conduct to be punishable). 
117 See Hyland, supra note 49, at 164-65 (using Thibert to discuss formal and substantive 
equality).  Hyland argues that the majority attempted to balance equality and individual 
responsibility but that the Thibert holding “seems to undermine the very principles of equality 
and individual responsibility it seeks to uphold.”  Id. at 168.  Hyland concludes:  
The evidence points to Norman Thibert seeking to maintain an unequal 
relationship of domination of his wife, a refusal on his part to recognize and 
accept her freedom within the relationship, including the freedom to leave it for 
another man.  In other words, Thibert’s actions leading up to the murder betray 
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disproportionate impact of the provocation defense on men and women in the context of heat of 
passion killings clearly indicates that the heat of passion defense does not satisfy substantive 
equality.  According to one Canadian commentator, the Canadian Supreme Court in Thibert  
“elevate[d] jealous husbands to a class or group with special characteristics that must be 
considered when determining if murder was a reasonable response to a deceased’s words.”118  
Since this decision, the Canadian Supreme Court has had opportunities to modify its view that 
requires provocation be considered in cases of rage and jealousy; it has not done so.119  Clearly, 
the Charter’s substantive equality values have had no influence on Canada’s law of provocation.  
VI. Australian Provocation Law 
Among the three countries, Australia is the trend-setter on the law of provocation.  Both 
in its national case law and in the statutes in a number of its states, Australian criminal law has 
been much less supportive of traditional provocation doctrine and more willing to incorporate 
substantive equality into the law of domestic homicide.  In Australia, as in the United States, 
each state provides its own statutory or common-law definition of crimes and defenses.  Until 
                                                                                                                                                             
the democratic and universal ideal of gender equality, which provide the social 
and cultural context within to assess his responsibility for Sherren’s murder.   
Id. at 169. 
118 See Gorman, supra note 49, at 499.  
119 See R. v. Stone, [1999] S.C.R. 290, 304 (Can.) (deciding a case where a man stabbed his 
nagging wife forty-seven times); see also R. v. Parent, [2001] S.C.R. 761, 763 (Can.) (deciding a 
case where a man shot his wife six times during an argument).  The non-provocation treatment in 
Parent was criticized as avoiding the issue of provocation when in fact it “was more 
authentically a case about the operation of the partial defence of provocation in section 232 of 
the Criminal Code than about intent.”  Trotter, supra note 49, at 688 (emphasis in original).  In 
contrast to the disappointing response to feminist concerns about provocation, the Canadian 
Supreme Court has responded to battered women and self-defense in a way that is more 
consistent with its endorsement of substantive equality.  See, e.g., R. v. Malott, [1998] S.C.R. 
123, 124 (Can.) (stating juries must assess the perceptions of a battered woman who has killed 
her abuser in light of the history of her abuse when determining if the woman’s actions were 
reasonable); R. v. LaVallee, [1990] S.C.R. 852, 854 (Can.) (permitting an appeal against a guilty 
verdict based on expert testimony indicating that battered women can discern when their 
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recently, all Australian states provided a partial excuse for killing in the heat of passion.  
However, Australian courts and legislatures have become far less willing to excuse domestic 
homicides committed in the heat of passion.  
In 1995, Australia’s High Court held in Masciantonio v. R. that the rules for provocation 
were uniformly traditional throughout Australia.120  The High Court’s test requires the jury to 
decide whether the victim’s provocation could cause an ordinary person to lose self-control and 
kill.121  Under this test, one might expect that men who commit domestic homicide out of rage or 
jealousy would be quite successful in seeking to assert a provocation defense.  Surprisingly, the 
appellate case law suggests otherwise.  
The most important High Court decision concerning provocation in the context of 
domestic homicide is Stingel v. R, in which a young man killed his former girlfriend’s current  
lover.122  The defendant in Stingel stalked his former girlfriend and found her having sex with 
                                                                                                                                                             
batterers intend life-threatening violence through the cycle of violence). 
120 (1995) 129 A.L.R. 575 (Austl.).  
121 See id.  The test for provocation is:    
The provocation must be such that it is capable of causing an ordinary person to 
lose self-control and to act in a way in which the accused did.  The provocation 
must actually cause the accused to lose-self-control and the accused must act 
whilst deprived of self-control before he has had the opportunity to regain his 
composure. 
Id.; see also VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 23 (summarizing the High 
Court’s test for provocation as requiring evidence: (1) of something accepted as provocation; (2) 
that the accused lost self-control as a result of provocation; and (3) that the provocation was 
capable of causing an ordinary person to lose self-control and form an intent to inflict grievous 
bodily harm or death). 
122 See (1990) 171 C.L.R. 312 (Austl.) (applying only to Queensland and Western Australia, 
states that base provocation statutes on the Griffith Criminal Code enacted in Queensland in 
1899 and Western Australia in 1903); see also DESMOND O’CONNOR & P.A. FAIRALL, CRIMINAL 
DEFENCES IN AUSTRALIA, PROVOCATION 202 (4th ed. 2005).  For more information on the 
Griffith Code, see generally The Honourable Sir Harry Gibbs, The Queensland Criminal Code: 
From Italy to Zanzibar, July 19, 2002, http://www.courts.qld.gov.au/library/exhibition/crimcode/ 
20020719_Harry%20Gibbs.pdf.   
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her new boyfriend.123  When he told the defendant to “piss off you cunt,” the defendant stabbed 
him to death.124  The facts of this case were quite similar to those in the Canadian Supreme 
Court’s Thibert case.125  However, unlike the Thibert Court, the Australian High Court held that, 
as a matter of law, the ordinary person test was not satisfied.126  Therefore, the Court in Stingel 
found that the trial court’s refusal to give a provocation instruction was correct.127  The Court 
concluded, “no jury, acting reasonably, could fail to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that 
the [defendant’s] reaction to the conduct of the deceased fell far below the minimum limits of the 
range of powers of self-control which must be attributed to any hypothetical ordinary nineteen-
year-old.”128  This decision was based on Tasmania’s then existing provocation statute,129 which 
the High Court noted was similar to Canada’s federal provocation statute.130 
The High Court set out a hybrid two-step test for provocation that has been widely 
criticized in Australia as being too complex and hard to follow.131  After factoring in any relevant 
personal characteristics of the defendant in determining the gravity of the provocation, the only 
attribute of the defendant that is to be considered in deciding whether such provocation could 
cause an ordinary person to lose control is the defendant’s age.132  Compared to provocation tests 
                                                 
123 See Stingel, 171 C.L.R. at 317-18.  Killing the male lover is another all too common form of 
domestic homicide.   
124 See id. at 319-20. 
125 See supra notes 104-110 and accompanying text. 
126 See Stingel, 171 C.L.R. at 336-37. 
127 See id. 
128 Id. at 337-38. 
129 See Criminal Code Act, 1924, § 160 (repealed 2003) (stating that a jury could find 
manslaughter if the accused caused death “in the heat of passion” caused by “any wrongful act or 
insult of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of self-control.”); see also 
Stingel, 171 C.L.R. at 320. 
130 See Stingel, 171 C.L.R. at 320-21. 
131 See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 5, at 34-35.  
132 See Stingel, 171 C.L.R. at 329. 
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used in the United States133 and Canada,134 Australia’s test is somewhat less subjective because 
the accused’s gender and other personal characteristics are not as fully factored in to how an 
ordinary person would respond to the provocation.135  Applying this test, numerous Australian 
lower appellate courts have also upheld trial courts’ refusals to give provocation instructions in 
cases involving male rage and jealousy, including cases involving husbands killing their 
wives.136  Some of these cases openly acknowledge that the provocation defense is gender-
biased.137  Thus, it appears that Australian courts, when faced with a traditional provocation rule, 
                                                 
133 See, e.g., People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777, 780 (Cal. 1976) (measuring the defendant’s reaction 
to his victim’s alleged provocation against that of “an ordinary man of average disposition.”); 
accord People v. Lujan, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 769, 786 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
134 See, e.g., R. v. Thibert, [1996] D.L.R. (4th) 675, 683 (Can.) (summarizing that the ordinary 
person test should consider the accused’s age, sex and “other factors” in order to determine the 
reasonableness of the loss of self-control).  But see R. v. Hill, [1986] S.C.R. 313, 314 (Can.) 
(affirming that age and gender were the only necessary factors to be considered for the ordinary 
person test in this gay panic case).  Hill is the basis for the test applied in Stingel; however, 
Australia limits the test to age only, not gender.  Id. See generally Morgan, supra note 2, at 258.  
135 See Stingel, 171 C.L.R. at 331 (holding that the ordinary person test can include the age of the 
accused and that other relevant qualifying attributes may be considered when evaluating the 
gravity of the provocation); see also VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 5, at 25-26 
(providing an example of how this test would be applied).  For example, 
[I]f a [thirty-three]-year-old white man with a stutter killed his estranged wife 
after she had made disparaging remarks about him and teased him about his 
stutter, in determining the gravity of the provocation, the jury may consider how 
an ordinary [thirty-three]-year-old white man with a stutter might have viewed 
those comments.  The jury would then have to consider how an ordinary adult not 
sharing any of the accused’s characteristics, such as his stutter or sex, might have 
reacted to provocation of that gravity. 
Id.  
136 See, e.g., Hart v. The Queen (2003) 139 A. Crim. R. 520, 545 (Austl.) (affirming the trial 
court’s conclusion that the appellant husband failed to demonstrate any issue of provocation 
when he killed his estranged wife after seeing her kiss another man); R. v. Kumar (2002) 133 A. 
Crim. R. 245, ¶ 3 (Austl.) (affirming the trial court’s withdrawal of provocation from the jury 
where a husband killed his de facto wife after she insulted him); see also R. v. Leonboyer (2001) 
V.S.C.A. 149, ¶ 72 (Austl.) (affirming the trial judge’s conclusion not to leave provocation to the 
jury where a man killed his girlfriend after allegedly hearing of her infidelity).  But see R. v. 
Yasso (2004) V.S.C.A. 127, ¶¶ 48-50 (Austl.) (granting an appeal against applicant husband’s 
murder conviction to allow the defense of provocation to be open to the jury).  
137 See Yasso, V.S.C.A. at ¶ 43 (acknowledging that it is justifiable to assert that the provocation 
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usually look unfavorably on allowing provocation in cases of male rage and jealousy.138 
 There are exceptions, however.  Recently, an Australian jury in Victoria was instructed 
on and accepted a provocation claim by James Ramage, who killed his wife Julie because she 
told him that she had found someone else and that sex with Ramage repulsed her.139  The jury 
verdict and the eleven-year sentence led to national outcry and public debate over the 
appropriateness of the provocation defense.140  During this debate, the Victorian Law Reform 
Commission released its final report on defenses to homicide that included a recommendation 
that the state parliament abolish provocation entirely.141  In January 2005, the political leader of 
Victoria, Acting Premier John Thwaites, promised to introduce legislation to abolish the 
defense;142 in November 2005, the Victorian Parliament abolished provocation.143  Previously,  
Tasmania was the first Australian state to abolish the defense, in 2003.144  
                                                                                                                                                             
defense is “imbued with gender bias”); see also Morgan, supra note 2, at 255 (discussing gender 
bias in provocation cases).   
138 See, e.g., R. v. Muy Ky Chhay (1994) 72 A. Crim. R. 1 (Austl.) (citing Stingel and extending 
the provocation defense to battered women, even where the battered woman killed her batterer 
while he was asleep).    
139See Victoria Considers Reform of Provocation Defense (ABC radio broadcast Dec. 9, 2004), 
available at http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2004/s1261755.htm (describing anger and 
political mobilization in Victoria due to the reduced sentence given to James Ramage, who killed 
his estranged wife); see also R. v. Butay (2001) V.S.C. 417, ¶ 2 (Austl.) (finding the husband 
guilty of manslaughter by way of provocation because his wife taunted him about her affair); 
VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 280-81 (discussing Butay as part of a case 
study).  
140 See Govt Abolishes Provocation Defence, THE AGE (Austl.), Jan. 20, 2005 [hereinafter Govt 
Abolishes] (noting that Julie Ramage’s death became a focal point for reform with more than 
3,500 letters sent to her family urging government action); see also Ian Munro, The World’s Best 
Justice?, THE AGE (Austl.), Nov. 17, 2004, at A3, 4. 
141 See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 20. 
142 See Press Release, Office of Premier, Abolition of Provocation as a Defence to Homicide 
(Jan. 21, 2005 Austl.) (on file with the American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & 
the Law). 
143 See Crimes (Homicide) Act, 2005, No. 77/2005, § 3B (Austrl.) (amending Crimes Act, 1958).   
144 See Criminal Code Act, 1924 (Tas.), amended by Criminal Code Amendment (Abolition of 
Defence of Provocation) Act, 2003 (Tas.). 
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Australia is the only country in which any of its jurisdictions have abolished provocation 
altogether.145  It is not a coincidence that Victoria and Tasmania are two of the four Australian 
states that have abolished mandatory minimum sentencing for murder.146  The ability of trial 
judges to tailor murder sentences,147 along with concerns about the provocation defense’s 
unfairness to women,148 were influential in both states’ decisions.  However, while both states 
have justified abolition by focusing on judicial discretion in sentencing as a substitute for the 
ameliorating effect of the provocation defense in some intentional homicide cases, their 
approaches to abolition differ. 
                                                 
145 See Criminal Code Act, 1995 (Austl.) (demonstrating that the Commonwealth of Australia 
does not have a provocation defense as part of its criminal law).  Because the Commonwealth 
has never had a provocation defense, it is technically the first jurisdiction not to allow 
provocation.  However, since homicide is rarely prosecuted as a federal crime, the lack of a 
provocation defense has little practical impact. 
146 See Crimes Act, 1900 (N.S.W.) (containing no mandatory minimum sentence for murder in 
New South Wales); Crimes Act, 1900, § 13 (Austl. Cap. Terr.) (containing no mandatory 
minimum sentence for murder in the Australian Capital Territory); VICTORIAN LAW REFORM 
COMM’N, supra note 6, at 51 (discussing both states’ modified provocation rules that make it 
easier for battered women to assert the defense); see also infra notes 238-239 and accompanying 
text. 
147 See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 33 (asserting that because judges can 
tailor sentences, provocation should be taken into account at sentencing along with other 
mitigating factors instead of existing as an independent defense).  See generally Remarks on 
Criminal Code Amendment Bill, supra note 90. 
148 See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 27-28; see also Govt Abolishes, supra 
note 140 (quoting Victoria’s Attorney-General Rob Hulls as saying: “[p]rovocation is a hangover 
from a bygone era where women were actually treated as chattels.”).  The debate in the 
Tasmanian Parliament was more divided.  The Attorney General Judith Jackson, who introduced 
the bill to abolish provocation, spoke explicitly about provocation being “gender biased and 
unjust.”  See Remarks on Criminal Code Amendment Bill, supra note 90, at 60.  However, two 
of the three legislators who commented on the bill, Michael Hodgman and Mr. McKim, while 
supporting it, expressly rejected gender-bias as a reason for repeal.  Id.  Their responses were in 
terms of formal equality, arguing that both women and men use the defense and are capable of 
similar violence.  Id.  However, like the Victorian Law Reform Commission, the Model Criminal 
Code Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General cited gender bias as a 
major reason for its recommendation that the provocation defense be abolished.  See MODEL 
CRIMINAL CODE, OFFICERS COMM. OF THE STANDING COMM. OF ATTORNEYS-GENERAL, 
DISCUSSION PAPER, MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, CH. 5, FATAL OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON 103 
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A. Victoria’s Approach 
In addition to abolishing provocation, the Victorian Law Reform Commission’s 
recommendations included reintroducing the partial defense of excessive self-defense.149  It did 
this for the express purpose of allowing those battered women who kill, but who are unable to 
obtain an acquittal for self-defense because their response to their fear was found unreasonable, 
to still be able to prove the lesser crime of manslaughter.150  One reason for urging the 
reintroduction of excessive self-defense was to influence battered women who, under the then 
existing system, might choose to plead guilty to manslaughter based on provocation out of 
concern that going to trial on self-defense could result in a murder conviction.  The Commission 
believed that after the abolition of provocation such women would more likely risk going to trial 
on self-defense, knowing that a jury could find the back-up partial defense of excessive self-
defense.151  Thus, under the Commission’s proposal, manslaughter would be available for fear, 
                                                                                                                                                             
(June 1998) [hereinafter MODEL CRIMINAL CODE].   
149 See Zecevic v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecution (1987) 162 C.L.R. 645, ¶ 13 (Austl.) (abandoning the 
excessive self-defense doctrine because the difficulty and risk of error in applying it to the facts 
of a given case proved greater than any advantages of its use).   
150 See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 269.  Recently, a simplified modern 
version of excessive self-defense was enacted in New South Wales which provides: 
(1) This section applies if: (a) the person uses force that involves the infliction of 
death, and (b) the conduct is not a reasonable response in the circumstances as he 
or she perceives them, but the person believes the conduct is necessary: (c) to 
defend himself or herself or another person, or (d) to prevent or terminate the 
unlawful deprivation of his or her liberty or the liberty of another person.   
(2) The person is not criminally responsible for murder but, on a trial for murder, 
the person is to be found guilty of manslaughter if the person is otherwise 
criminally responsible for manslaughter. 
Crimes Act 1900, § 421 (N.S.W.).  Excessive self-defense has an American analogue in the 
partial defense of imperfect self-defense, which is allowed in a minority of American 
jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Laurie J. Taylor, Comment, Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-
of-Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1679, 1707-08 (1986).   
151 See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 102 (acknowledging that this 
decision could backfire, and a jury that would otherwise have acquitted based on self-defense, 
might opt for excessive self-defense instead, resulting in a manslaughter conviction).   
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the emotion that motivates more women who commit domestic homicide, but no longer allowed 
for rage and jealousy, the emotions that motivate more men who commit domestic homicide.  As 
the Commission noted: “Excessive self-defence would seem to better fit the circumstances of 
women who kill in this context than . . . the existing partial defence of provocation . . . [because 
t]here is no need, as for provocation, to establish that the accused acted due to a ‘loss of self-
control’.”152  
The Victorian Parliament heeded the Commission’s advice, but instead of reintroducing 
the partial excuse of excessive self-defense, it enacted a new crime called “defensive 
homicide.”153  This crime has no minimum sentence and provides a maximum sentence of 
twenty years;154 the same penalty that applied to the manslaughter based on provocation before it 
was abolished.155  Defensive homicide is committed when a person kills another while believing 
the conduct was necessary to defend herself or another from death or “really serious injury” 
                                                 
152 See id. 
 [Defensive homicide is] similar in some ways to the common-law rule of 
‘excessive self-defence’ that existed prior to 1987 but was abolished by the High 
Court’s decision in Zecevic’s case. 
Under the earlier common-law rule of excessive self-defence, and the provisions 
of other jurisdictions, a person who has a genuine belief that his or her conduct is 
necessary in self-defence, but who is not considered to have acted reasonably is 
guilty of the lesser offence of manslaughter.  However, there could be confusion 
about the basis of the jury’s verdict, as there were several potentially inconsistent 
ways that a jury could reach a manslaughter verdict.  The new offence of 
defensive homicide will clearly indicate the basis of the jury’s verdict to the 
sentencing judge.  This will enable the sentencing judge to impose a sentence that 
accurately reflects the crime that the person committed. 
Crimes (Homicide) Bill: Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Before the Victorian Legislative 
Assembly, 55th Parliament, 1789 (Oct. 27, 2005) (statement of Honourable J.M. Madden, 
Minister f153 See Crimes (Homicide) Act, 2005, No. 77/2005, §§ 4, 9AD (Austrl.) (amending 
Crimes Act, 1958). 
or Sport and Recreation).  
154 See Crimes (Homicide) Act at § 9AD. 
155 See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 274. 
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where she did not have reasonable grounds for this belief.156  This new crime was enacted to 
address family violence situations where the defendant killed out of fear but is unable to meet the 
reasonableness requirement for self-defense.157  As Attorney General Rob Hulls noted in his 
discussion of this crime before the Legislative Assembly: “This is a reform that is aimed at 
removing entrenched bias and misogynist assumptions from the law to make sure that women 
who kill while genuinely believing it is the only way to protect themselves or their children are 
not condemned as murderers.”158 
The Victorian Parliament’s abolition of provocation and enactment of the new offense of 
defensive homicide are clear examples of lawmakers choosing to substitute substantive for 
formal gender equality.159  As a result, the punishment for defensive homicide will be similar to 
                                                 
156 See Crimes (Homicide) Act at §§ 9AC, 9AD. 
157 Most commentators describe provocation as a partial excuse because the actor is not entirely 
to blame for what happened:  He either could not control his desire to kill, or demanding such 
control would be unfair in light of the provocation.  A few commentators describe provocation as 
a partial justification because the adequately provoked killer’s conduct has committed a lesser 
crime than one who intentionally kills without provocation.  See Stephen P. Garvey, Passion’s 
Puzzle, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 1677, 1680-82, 1693-00 (2005); see also LEE, supra note 18, at 227-30.  
The new crime of defensive homicide is a lesser crime than murder that appears to be a partial 
justification because the killing, though unreasonable, was committed for the morally defensible 
motive of fear.  
158 Crimes (Homicide) Bill: Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Before the Victorian Legislative 
Assembly, 55th Parliament, 1844 (Oct. 26, 2005) (statement of Honourable R.J. Hulls, Attorney 
General, Minister for Industrial Relations and Minister for Planning).  Other provisions of the 
Crimes (Homicide) Bill also were adopted with family violence in mind:  First, self defense was 
codified  in § 9AC and a special provision, § 9AH(1) provides rules concerning lack of 
immediacy and excessive force that apply solely where family violence is alleged.  Second, § 
9AH(2)-(4) expressly describes certain kinds of evidence that may be introduced in domestic 
homicide cases.  See Crimes (Homicide) Act at §§ 9AC, 9AH(1)-(4). 
159 See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 15 (providing a substantive equality 
rationale for its recommendations).  The Commission noted:   
Defences and/or partial defences to homicide should not be based on abstract 
philosophical principles, but should reflect the context in which homicides 
typically occur.  In particular, the law should deal fairly with both men and 
women who kill and defences should be constructed in a way that take account of 
the fact they tend to kill in different circumstances.   
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what was available through provocation to battered women who kill but are unable to prove they 
acted in self-defense.  However, punishment for people who kill out of anger and possessiveness 
may be substantially greater under a murder conviction than it was when provocation made the 
lesser crime of manslaughter available to them.  Victoria’s new laws provide an opportunity to 
determine whether expressly feminist legislation that seeks to provide substantive equality, in 
practice changes how men and women who kill out of jealousy and anger, or fear and despair, 
are treated by a common law criminal justice system.   
B. Tasmania’s Approach 
The Tasmanian approach to abolishing provocation differed substantially from that of 
Victoria.  While there had been cases160 and commentary161 demonstrating that Tasmania’s 
traditional provocation rule could produce distressingly male-biased results,162 there was no law 
reform report or specific case that provided either a feminist or other impetus for eliminating the 
defense of provocation.  Furthermore, unlike the Victorian Law Reform Commission, Tasmanian 
Attorney General Judith Jackson’s proposal to abolish provocation was unaccompanied by any 
                                                                                                                                                             
Id.  
160 See, e.g., Hutton v. The Queen, (1986) 20 A. Crim. R. 315 (Austl.) (expanding the scope of 
provocation in cases involving male rage and jealousy) discussed in detail infra, notes 208-212, 
and accompanying text; see also R. v. Franke (Aug. 22, 1984) 2 (Tas.) (on file with the 
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law) (convicting a battered woman 
of manslaughter).  In this case, preceding Hutton, the defendant was being sexually assaulted by 
her husband with the handle of a claw hammer when she seized it, struck and killed him, and 
then disposed of the body.  Id. at 3.  The decedent was reported to have been cruel to defendant 
and their children.  Id.  The Court accepted that defendant “lost the power of self-control and 
caused her husband’s death in the heat of sudden provocation.”  Id.; see also Bradfield, supra 
note 30, at 15.  The defendant was sentenced to three years imprisonment.  KATE WARNER, 
SENTENCING IN TASMANIA 275, n.43 (2d ed. 2002). 
161 See, e.g., Bradfield, supra note 30, at 5-7.         
162 On the other hand, Tasmania was the jurisdiction out of which Stingel arose.  The trial judge 
and Tasmanian appellate court both held that a provocation instruction should not have been 
allowed.  See Stanley M. H. Yeo, Power of Self-Control in Provocation and Automatism, 14 
SYDNEY L. REV. 3, 3 (1992).     
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other recommendations.163  Instead, Jackson, as a Member of Parliament for the majority Labor 
Party, simply brought her proposal to abolish provocation to Parliament for their 
consideration.164  She asserted that abolition would not “in any way” be detrimental to battered 
women.165  After a lively discussion, the Tasmania Parliament voted unanimously to abolish 
provocation.166 
Tasmania’s abolition of provocation appears to be a positive step on behalf of women.  
The shift in power from the jury to the judge assumes that judges, through sentencing discretion, 
will be more likely to punish severely those murderers who kill out of rage and jealousy while 
providing only light sentences when murderers are battered women who kill out of fear.  It 
remains to be seen whether this assumption proves correct.  Especially uncertain is how battered 
women, who would have previously relied on provocation, will fare without this defense.  Will 
the lack of either this backup partial defense, or a substitute such as the defensive homicide 
crime enacted in Victoria, cause more battered women to go to trial on complete self-defense 
because the only option for a plea is murder?167  Will juries convict them of murder or, instead, 
be more inclined than when provocation was a middle ground, to acquit them based on complete 
self-defense?168  Because Tasmania has so few homicides, these concerns are unlikely to be 
                                                 
163 See Remarks on Criminal Code Amendment Bill, supra note 90 (indicating that the Attorney 
General had the support of the Tasmanian Director of Public Prosecutions, Mr. Ellis, in his 2000-
01 report where he questioned retaining provocation). 
164 See id.  
165 See id. 
166 See id. 
167 Diminished responsibility, another partial defense that is often used to reduce murder to 
manslaughter in the domestic homicide context, is not available in either Tasmania or Victoria.  
See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6.                                              
168 See Rebecca Bradfield, The Demise of Provocation in Tasmania, 27 CRIM. L.J. 322, 324 
(2003). 
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resolved for some time.169 
Two effects of Victoria’s and Tasmania’s abolition of provocation are clear.  Juries no 
longer have a say in the assessment of culpability among those killers committing intentional 
homicide based on heat of passion.  Furthermore, killers who previously would not have been 
labeled murderers will now bear that label.  The difference, however, between the two states is 
that in Tasmania both heat of passion and fear-based domestic homicides will be treated as 
murder while Victoria will allow juries to find a lesser crime for the fear-based homicides.  
In a few years time a comparison can be made between the domestic homicide decisions 
and sentencing in Victoria and Tasmania and also between their outcomes and those in 
jurisdictions that retain the provocation defense.  It may then be possible to determine whether 
Victoria’s lesser crime of defensive homicide is beneficial for battered women and therefore 
whether it is important of provide such an alternative to murder instead of simply, as in 
Tasmania, abolishing provocation.  Whether it is beneficial will depend on what prosecutors and 
juries do.  Will Victorian prosecutors and juries simply substitute defensive homicide for 
provocation, and therefore, routinely find this lesser crime or will they more frequently opt for 
acquittal based on complete self-defense?170  Will prosecutors and juries in Tasmania more 
frequently opt for murder or complete self-defense for battered women who kill?  In time, it 
should also become apparent in both states whether judges are sentencing men who murder in 
the heat of passion more severely than was the case for similarly situated men who were 
                                                 
169 According to the author’s review of all of Tasmania’s domestic homicide cases and sentences 
between June 1, 2003 and March 31, 2005, Tasmania has very few homicide cases each year.  
Since provocation was abolished, there have been no convictions or sentences involving 
domestic homicide as of March 2005.  
170 See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 103-04 (recommending that if 
excessive self-defense is enacted, then in five years the Victorian Department of Justice should 
review the interaction of the defense with complete self-defense and with plea and trial practices 
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previously convicted of manslaughter.171 
 The abolition of provocation is unlikely to sweep Australia.  The critical reason is that 
while no Australian state has a mandatory minimum sentence for manslaughter, unlike Victoria 
and Tasmania, some Australian states have mandatory minimum sentences for murder.172  
Abolishing provocation leaves only the options of acquittal or murder unless some other basis for 
manslaughter such as excessive self-defense or a lesser crime such as defensive homicide is 
created.  The mandatory sentencing requirement for murder then prevents judges from tailoring 
murder sentences to take into account circumstances surrounding the killing, such as whether 
there was any violent provocation or merely an attempt to exercise sexual autonomy or leave the 
relationship.  
VII. Changing Social Norms  
 Even though the criminal law doctrine differs, sometimes dramatically, social norms 
appear to be affecting the outcomes in domestic homicide cases involving heat of passion and 
fear in all three countries.  For example, while substantive equality has had little influence on the 
statutes and appellate case law in Canada concerning the heat of passion basis for provocation, 
its impact on sentencing in Canadian cases indicates that excusing men who kill in a jealous rage 
has become less socially acceptable.  Once a jury finds provocation, Canada only minimally 
restricts sentencing discretion173 and therefore judges can factor in the circumstances 
surrounding the killing in deciding the appropriate punishment to impose.  Currently, Canadian 
judges appear to be sentencing men who kill out of rage and jealousy quite differently than they 
                                                                                                                                                             
to make sure it is having the desired effect). 
171 See Bradfield, supra note 168, at 324.  
172 See, e.g., Criminal Code, 1899, § 305 (Queensl.); Criminal Code Act Compilation Act, 1913, 
§ 282 (W. Austl.).   
173 See supra notes 97-102, and accompanying text.  
 41
sentence battered women who kill.  In a recent Canadian case study, men who successfully used 
provocation in plea-bargaining or at trial were sentenced to six to twelve years, with no man 
receiving less than two years.174  In contrast, most of the women who successfully used 
provocation received sentences ranging from two years to suspended sentences; the longest 
sentence for any woman was five years.175  Thus, because of the flexibility of sentencing for 
manslaughter in Canada, judges are tailoring the punishment in provocation cases to fit the 
crime.  
There have been similar sentencing outcomes in provocation cases in Australia.176  One 
Australian study found that the average sentence length for women guilty of manslaughter was 
three to five years.177  In contrast, the average length for men guilty of manslaughter was six to 
eight years.178  The study also found that thirty-three percent of the women received non-
custodial sentences, compared with ten percent of the men.179  The likely reason for the different 
sentences for men and women is that existing provocation rules are at odds with the social norms 
concerning both killing out of possessiveness and anger and killing out of fear and despair.  
Further evidence that provocation rules do not represent current values is provided by Rebecca 
Bradfield’s study, discussed earlier, where battered women were highly successful in their use of 
provocation while men who killed in the heat of passion were much more likely to be found 
                                                 
174 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE CANADA, REPORT ON SENTENCING FOR MANSLAUGHTER CASES 
INVOLVING INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS (2003), http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/smir/ms_ 
int_rel_report_lawrev.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2005). 
175 See id. 
176 See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 275-83.  The Commission also noted, 
“juries in recent years may have become more reluctant to accept the partial defence of 
provocation.  The discretion of the trial judge not to leave provocation for the jury’s 
consideration has also been relied upon in a number of recent Victorian cases.”  Id. at 41. 
177 See NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 2, at 3.99. 
178 See id. 
179 See id. 
 42
guilty of murder.180 
Substantive equality may be making inroads in the United States as well.  Because of the 
evolution of social norms concerning appropriate responses to sexual jealousy, I suspect that 
juries, and prosecutors through plea-bargaining, are today more likely to opt for murder over 
manslaughter for rage-based domestic killings than in the past.181  A recent study of extreme 
emotional disturbance (EED) pleas and verdicts in New York City by Kirschner, Litwack and 
Galperin, provides intriguing evidence supporting this suspicion.182  This study looked at all 
cases where defendants pleaded EED to “charges of intentional murder or attempted intentional 
murder in New York County over a [ten]-year period (1988-1997).”183  The authors’ “major 
finding” was “that jurors, judges, and prosecutors were much more likely to accept a defense of 
EED when the defendant’s homicidal behavior was motivated significantly by an understandable 
fear . . . than when the defendant acted out of anger without fear of physical harm.”184 
The sample in the study was small, consisting of twenty-four cases where defendants 
argued EED in murder.185  Nine defendants were found guilty of, or pled guilty to, manslaughter; 
fifteen were found guilty of, or pled guilty to, murder.186  Only two of the twenty-four were 
female; they both pled guilty to manslaughter in cases where the dominating emotion was fear 
rather than anger.187  Only one of the nine manslaughter outcomes involved a man committing a 
                                                 
180 See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text. 
181 See LEE, supra note 18, at 66. 
182 Stuart M. Kirschner et al., The Defense of Extreme Emotional Disturbance, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 102 (2004).          
183 See id. at 102.                                                                     
184 See id.  
185 See id. at 108 
186 See id. at 110.  
187 See id. at 109, 116-17; see also supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.  
 43
domestic homicide.188  In contrast, ten of the fifteen cases where the outcome was murder 
involved men committing domestic homicides where the dominating emotion was anger.189  
Overall, the authors noted that “[i]n no case in our sample was pure rage viewed as 
reasonable.”190 
The authors noted that the concern that EED allowed cases of killing out of 
possessiveness and rage to reach the jury was justified.191  However, based on their findings, they 
suggested, “the problems [that commentators] perceive with the EED defense may be problems 
in theory rather than in practice.”192  They also noted that New York appellate decisions have 
upheld jury or judicial verdicts rejecting EED in heat of passion domestic homicide cases.193  
Finally, they pointed out that New York appellate courts have also upheld trial judges’ refusals to 
allow a jury to consider EED in such domestic homicide cases.194 
Further empirical research is needed to determine whether these findings from one county 
in New York are representative of how prosecutors, juries and judges are applying the 
provocation defense and EED in United States’ jurisdictions.  Considering the changes in recent 
years in the acceptability of jealous rage compared to fear as bases for a manslaughter 
outcome,195 however, it seems likely that these findings are representative.  In particular, since 
the EED defense is more sympathetic to defendants than traditional provocation, one would 
expect similar pro-fear and anti-jealousy results when a provocation defense was used.  If this 
turns out to be correct, it will mean that while juries are still being allowed to find manslaughter 
                                                 
188 See Kirschner et al., supra note 182, at 116-17. 
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190 See id. at 127. 
191 See id. at 125-26. 
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193 See id. 
194 See id.  
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in domestic homicide cases based on rage and those based on fear, the latter emotion is much 
more likely to lead to a manslaughter verdict.  Thus, substantive gender equality may be 
occurring in practice even though it does not appear to be in theory.  However, so long as 
determinate sentencing continues to be the norm in the United States, any attempt at substantive 
equality will be a blunt instrument.  Fear-based killings may more likely result in a substantial 
sentence for manslaughter (when acquittal based on self-defense is the fairer outcome), while 
killings out of possessiveness may more likely result in a much longer sentence for murder.   
 Another indicia of changing social norms include public outcry concerning publicized 
cases where killing in the heat of passion results in a manslaughter verdict.  For example, the 
Ramage case, discussed earlier,196 galvanized Victoria’s political leadership to seek to abolish 
provocation.197  In Canada, there also has been adverse public reaction to several high profile 
cases where men who committed domestic homicide out of jealousy and rage were able to rely 
on the provocation defense.198 Perhaps the most famous American case in recent years that led to 
                                                                                                                                                             
195 See LEE, supra note 18, at 66. 
196 See supra notes 139-144 and accompanying text.  
197 See Crimes (Homicide) Bill: Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Before the Victorian 
Legislative Council, 55th Parliament, 1924 (Nov. 15, 2005) (statement of Ms. Jenny Mikakos, 
Member of Victoria’s Legislative Council).  Ms. Mikakos noted:  
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Id.  
198 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE CANADA, CONSULTATIONS, REFORMING CRIMINAL CODE DEFENCES, 
PROVOCATION, SELF-DEFENCE AND DEFENCE OF PROPERTY, SECTION ONE: BACKGROUND AND 
CRITICISM, THE PROVOCATION DEFENSE, http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/ 
cons/rccd/section1p1.html (Sept. 29, 2005) (citing R. v. Stone, [1999] S.C.R. 290 (Can.), R. v. 
Thibert, [1996] S.C.R. 37 (Can.) and  R. v. Klassen, [1997] W.C.B 210 (Can.), as recent cases 
stirring “considerable public concern that the alleged provocation was inadequate to justify 
reducing the charge.”) (on file with the American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & 
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public outcry about men who kill in the heat of passion were the murders of OJ Simpson’s ex-
wife and her male friend.  Even though Simpson was acquitted because the State did not prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the killer (but later found him civilly liable for both 
victims’ wrongful deaths), the evidence presented as to motive provided a classic example of 
provocation of a violent, jealous and possessive man.199   
 The recent negative public responses to, and harsher sentencing of men who kill in the 
heat of passion, is based on a significant shift in values over the past half-century.  In the mid-
twentieth century, the law of provocation in Australia, Canada and the United States, became 
substantially more subjective and individualized,200 thereby, making the defense available to 
more killers by allowing juries to consider various aspects of their “human frailty.”201  The 
killers in the 1940s through 1980s for whom the broader subjective definition of provocation was 
created were overwhelmingly male.  
 Language in the 1963 Australia High Court opinion in Parker v. R202 demonstrates the 
use of changing values rationale for such expansion.  The wife of the defendant Parker had left 
him for another man, Dan Kelly.203  Parker’s wife and Kelly had departed together and were 
traveling on a public street when Parker, who pursued them, seriously injured his wife and killed 
Kelly.204  Relying on the defendant’s “human frailty” Chief Justice Dixon noted: 
We are not living in the conditions of the sixteenth, seventeenth or eighteenth 
century.  According to the standards governing our society in the later nineteenth 
                                                                                                                                                             
the Law).   
199 See FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 5, at xx. 
200 But see Bedder v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, (1954) 2 All ER 801 (H.L. U.K.) (presenting one 
high-water mark case where the test for provocation was said to be purely objective). 
201 See VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6, at 23-24 (indicating that acceptance of 
emotions other than jealousy and rage is a recent development). 
202 (1963) 111 C.L.R. 610, rev’d by Parker v. R., (1964) A.C. 1369 (Austl.). 
203 See id. at 619 (Dixon, C.J. dissenting). 
204 See id. at 619-20 (Dixon, C.J. dissenting). 
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century and the twentieth century the succession of events and the conduct of Dan 
Kelly brought a very strong provocation to an emotional nature, a provocation 
still in actual operation when Parker came upon Dan Kelly with his wife.205 
 
Chief Justice Dixon ended up in the dissent in the High Court’s decision in Parker; however, his 
view was vindicated when this case was reversed on appeal to the Privy Council.206  Throughout 
the 1960s through the 1980s, a number of Australian commentators advocated that the law of 
provocation become more subjective, taking into account the emotional equation of the 
individual killer who killed in the heat of passion.  As Stanley Yeo noted in an article published 
in 1987, “judges, reform commissioners and academic commentators alike have called for 
[elimination of the objective test] and replacement by a purely subjective test.”207 
 There are clear indications that some lawmakers are currently responding to a different 
social climate that is more sensitive to gender inequalities and less tolerant of the emotions of 
possessive rage and jealousy.  The dramatically different view and corresponding legal treatment 
of provocation in Australia today, compared to twenty to fifty years ago, demonstrates this point.  
In Tasmania, as recently as 1986, the highest state appellate court reversed the decision 
by the trial court, which had refused to allow the defendant to argue provocation.208  The 
defendant had shot and killed the woman he had been living with, who was married to another 
man at the time, and her new lover in a sudden rage.209  In its unanimous reversal, the court 
substantially broadened its interpretation of the statutory language, “wrongful act or insult,”210 to 
                                                 
205 See id. at 628-29 (Dixon, C.J. dissenting) (quoting from William Shakespeare’s “Othello,” 
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206 See Parker v. R., (1964) A.C. 1369 (Austl.). 
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allow the defendant’s former lover’s “scornful laugh” to provide sufficient insult to require 
consideration of provocation in both homicide cases.211  In defending this expansion, the court 
explained, “changing community values may render conduct not considered sufficient to raise 
the defence in one age sufficient in another to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-
control.”212 
 Seventeen years after this decision, the Tasmanian Parliament unanimously abolished 
provocation.213  Attorney General Judith Jackson (a member of the majority Labor Party) 
explained that “[t]he law has changed and society has changed.  An outdated and inappropriate 
defence for murder should not be retained in the twenty-first century.”214  The leaders of the 
minority Liberal and Green parties also voiced their support for the abolition of provocation.215  
These leaders expressly noted that their support was based how society had changed and argued 
that provocation’s “concession to human frailty” was neither a necessity nor “consistent with the 
expectations of a civilised society” especially in light of Tasmania’s abolition of a mandatory life 
sentence for murder.216  
What had happened between 1986 and 2003 that led lawmakers to go from expanding the 
application of provocation to abolition?  One major change during this time has been the 
growing awareness and understanding by lawmakers and the public about gender inequality and 
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211 See Hutton, 20 A. Crim. R. at 318. 
212 See id. at 321. 
213 See supra notes 160-166 and accompanying text. 
214 Remarks on Criminal Code Amendment Bill, supra note 90, at 60.  She gave the following 
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domestic violence.  The other was the abolition of the mandatory life sentence for murder.  
 The recent Victorian Law Reform Commission’s report combined with the adverse 
public and political reaction to the Ramage case is further evidence of how domestic homicide in 
the heat of passion is no longer viewed as deserving of compassion and empathy in Australia.  
The Commission’s Report, in urging that provocation be abolished, emphasized the changed 
values of the twenty-first century: 
Historically, an angry response to a provocation might have been excusable, but 
in the 21st century, the Victorian community has a right to expect people will 
control their behaviour, even when angry or emotionally upset—particularly when 
the consequences are as serious as homicide.217 
 
It also emphasized that the provocation defense is gender-biased: 
[P]rovocation is most often raised by men in the context of a relationship of 
sexual intimacy in circumstances involving jealousy or an apparent desire to 
retain control.  The continued existence or availability of provocation in these 
circumstances may therefore be seen as sending an unacceptable message—that 
men’s anger and use of violence against women is legitimate and excusable.  
Some people have questioned ‘how, in a supposedly “civilised” society, can the 
desire to leave a relationship constitute behaviour which would provoke anyone to 
kill?’218 
 
 The political leaders of Victoria agreed with the Commission’s views on both changed 
social norms and gender bias.  Attorney-General Rob Hulls stated, “the justice system had to be 
brought up to date with modern community values.”219  He also noted, “[p]rovocation is a 
hangover from a bygone era where women were actually treated as chattels.”220  The Acting 
Premier John Thwaites echoed the Attorney-General, noting that “the law of provocation was an 
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anachronism that no longer had a place in modern, civilised society.”221  He added that the 
“provocation defence was gender-biased and it promoted a blame-the-victim culture.”222  The 
Age, the leading newspaper in Victoria, in an editorial, also agreed that social norms no longer 
can tolerate the defense of provocation, describing it as “archaic” and urging it be 
“abandoned.”223  The editorial noted, “we no longer live in a time when ‘hot-blooded’ male 
violence is considered acceptable.”224  It concluded that “the law should reflect a society’s 
values” and, therefore, “[c]hange in this area is long overdue.”225 
 The Parliamentary debate in Victoria over abolishing provocation also frequently referred 
to changing social values.  One legislator, after referring to the Ramage case, noted that abolition 
“is essential in bringing our laws into line with community thinking and standards.”226  Another 
legislator said that abolition was “yet another step forward in the removal of that old-fashioned 
view that women were property and therefore men could do with women what they wished.”227  
Yet another commented that “[t]he law surrounding defences to homicide have not kept up with 
the pace of social change and changes to social values.”228 
 As the studies of sentencing, plea-bargaining and jury verdicts indicate, the change in 
social values in Tasmania and Victoria has also occurred in other Australian states, and in 
Canada and the United States.  Yet abolition of provocation has occurred in two Australian states 
                                                 
221 See id.  
222 See id.  
223 See Time to Abolish the Provocation Defense, THE AGE (Austl.), Oct. 30, 2004, at 10.  
224 See id. 
225 See id. 
226 Crimes (Homicide) Bill: Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Before the Victorian Legislative 
Council, 55th Parliament, 1839 (Oct. 26, 2005) (statement of Ms. Maxine Morand, Member of 
Victoria’s Legislative Assembly). 
227 Id. at 1841 (statement of Ms. Louise Asher).  
 50
without a mandatory life sentence for murder but not in any state that does impose such a 
sentence.  This suggests that the will to incorporate substantive equality into the criminal law 
surrounding domestic homicide exists, but not at the price of increasing the risk of a life sentence 
for murder for either women who kill out of fear or, perhaps, even for men who kill out of anger 
and jealousy.  Because of the lack of mandatory minimum sentences for manslaughter in other 
Australian states and only modest minimum manslaughter sentences in Canada, trial judges have 
been able to incorporate these social values and the resulting substantive equality into the 
sentencing discretion that judges have once provocation has been found.  In the United States, 
which provides a greater variety of determinate sentencing for both murder and manslaughter, 
there is less ability to provide women who kill out of fear, but fail to prove self-defense, to be 
given a non-custodial or very short sentence.  Therefore, the values favoring people who kill out 
of fear and disfavoring people who kill out of anger and possessiveness may mainly be reflected 
in jury verdicts and plea bargains.229 
VIII.  Is Abolition of Provocation Necessary? 
There is much to be said for allowing juries to decide the provocation issue rather than 
leaving it solely to judges through sentencing discretion as has been done in Tasmania through 
its abolition of provocation. There is even reason for concern when the only emotion to be 
considered in allowing a lesser offence to be decided by a jury is fear, as has been done in 
Victoria.  Professor Cynthia Lee in her book, Murder and the Reasonable Man: Passion and 
Fear in the Criminal Courtroom, provides a number of reasons why juries should still be allowed 
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to find provocation.230  Most convincing is her claim concerning the civic educational value of 
juries deciding provocation.231  She notes that “[j]urors should be encouraged to deliberate 
explicitly about social norms, stereotypes, and bias when deciding what constitutes reasonable 
provocation . . . [because they] deliver . . . commonsense justice . . . [and] serve as a bulwark 
against overzealous government prosecutors and cynical judges.”232  
While reviewing Lee’s, Murder and the Reasonable Man: Passion and Fear in the 
Criminal Courtroom, I considered whether to recommend abolishing provocation.233  Lee’s 
argument for continuing to include the jury in the normative decision of how to treat men who 
kill out of rage and jealousy helped convince me that abolition is probably the wrong response.  
Both Lee and I prefer that the court educate the jury about the gender and other biases stemming 
from existing social norms that provocation law elicits.234  Our goal is to enable the jury to 
recognize the prejudices that exist in our society, and thereby, encourage them to empathize with 
parties who are not from the traditionally dominant groups.   
Very few courts do the kind of explicit gender and other-bias education of the jury that 
Lee and I advocate.235  However, perhaps this is less necessary than in the past.  The provocation 
rules in the United States, Canada and much of Australia continue to represent formal gender 
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the elimination of provocation limits what kinds of arguments and evidence a criminal defendant 
can present when a criminal defendant is at a huge disadvantage vis-a-vis the prosecution from 
the start.  Id. 
231 See id. at 247.  
232 Id. 
233 See Forell, supra note 23, at 599. 
234 See LEE, supra note 18, at 217-20 (switching the genders of the parties in a case involving 
provocation); see also Forell, supra note 23, at 614-18 (applying the reasonable woman standard 
as to what is ordinary in provocation cases regardless of the gender of the parties). 
235 See LEE, supra note 18, at 256-58 (describing a rare example of a judge instructing a jury in a 
way that enables them to empathize with the member of the non-dominant group). 
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equality that allows jury empathy for men who kill in a jealous rage.  Nevertheless, changes in 
social norms have allowed substantive gender equality to be incorporated in provocation law’s 
application by juries, as well as judges and prosecutors.  When given the choice between 
manslaughter and murder for battered women who kill, juries prefer manslaughter; in contrast 
when given that choice for killings in the heat of passion, juries prefer murder.236  Therefore, in 
jurisdictions with mandatory minimum sentences for murder, domestic homicide law may be as 
fair and equal as is currently possible.  Until judges are given greater discretion in sentencing, 
and the law and application of self-defense is more understanding of battered women’s 
situations, current provocation law, as applied, may be the best that it can be. 
Now that two common law jurisdictions have abolished provocation it is particularly 
important to consider whether abolition is in fact the most effective method for achieving 
maximum substantive gender equality.  In addition to leaving a traditional jury function to judges 
and legislatures, abolition runs two risks concerning domestic homicides: juries acquitting 
jealous killers rather than convicting them for murder, and juries convicting battered women of 
murder instead of acquitting them.  Finally, it labels all convicted intentional killers, including 
battered women, as murderers.237 While replacing provocation with excessive/imperfect self-
defense or Victoria’s new crime of defensive homicide that only apply to killing out of fear 
solves half the problem, it leaves only an all or nothing solution for people who kill in the heat of 
passion regardless of whether the killing was a domestic homicide or not.  
                                                 
236 See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. 
237 There are also serious implications for heat of passion killings outside the domestic homicide 
area.  Abolition of provocation removes it as a partial defense for these kinds of killings as well.  
Whether this is a good idea received no consideration in the deliberations by the Tasmanian and 
Victorian parliaments when they voted to abolish provocation.  For examples of non-domestic 
homicide situations, see Stephen P. Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 1677, 1679 
(2005). 
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Canada and some Australian states’ current treatment, which allows juries to find 
provocation that results in a manslaughter verdict and then gives trial judges broad discretion to 
tailor the sentence, may, in fact, work better than abolition, so long as most prosecutors, juries 
and judges have embraced the view that jealousy and rage are less deserving emotions than fear 
and despair.  Jurisdictions that have enlightened provocation rules may provide greater 
protection for battered women who kill while also allowing severe punishment of people who 
kill out of possessiveness.  In particular, two Australian jurisdictions, Australian Capital 
Territory238 and New South Wales,239 may have the best solution currently possible.  Both have 
provocation statutes that have attempted to account for the problems battered women who kill 
face when trying to claim provocation.  In addition, neither has a mandatory minimum sentence 
                                                 
238 See Crimes Act, 1900, §13 (Austl. Cap. Terr.). 
(1) If, on trial for murder (a) it appears that the act or omission causing death 
occurred under provocation; and (b) apart from this subsection and the 
provocation, the jury would have found the accused guilty of murder; the jury 
shall acquit the accused of murder and find him guilty of manslaughter.  
(2) For subsection (1), an act or omission causing death shall be taken to have 
occurred under provocation if (a) the act or omission was the result of the 
accused’s loss of self-control induced by any conduct of the deceased (including 
grossly insulting words or gestures) towards or affecting the accused; and (b) the 
conduct of the deceased was such as could have induced an ordinary person in the 
position of the accused to have so far lost self-control (i)  as to have formed an 
intent to kill the deceased; or (ii) as to be recklessly indifferent to the probability 
of causing deceased’s death; whether that conduct of the deceased occurred 
immediately before the act or omission causing death or at any previous time  
. . . . 
(4) For the purpose of determining whether an act or omission causing death 
occurred under provocation, there is no rule that provocation is negatived if (a) 
there was not a reasonable proportion between the act or omission causing the 
death and the conduct of the deceased that induced the act or omission; or (b) the 
act or omission causing the death did not occur suddenly; or (c) the act of 
omission causing the death occurred with any intent to take life or inflict grievous 
bodily harm).  
Id. 
239 See Crimes Act, 1900, §§ 23, 421 (N.S.W.) (containing substantially similar content to the 
provocation statute in the Australian Capital Territory). 
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for manslaughter or murder.  Thus, regardless of whether a jury finds a battered woman guilty of 
manslaughter or murder, the trial judge still has the ability to tailor the sentence to take her 
circumstances into account.  
While changes in the law of provocation may no longer be as crucial to assuring 
substantive gender equality, even greater efforts should be made to ensure battered women 
receive substantive equality under self-defense law so that more often, when battered women kill 
out of fear, they are either not charged or are acquitted.  Unfortunately, regardless of enlightened 
reforms of both provocation and self-defense rules, social norms, or as Wendy Williams calls 
them, “cultural limits,” may continue to stand in the way of complete substantive equality for 
battered women.240  Prosecutors, judges and jurors may still refuse to fully excuse intentional 
killing based on fear where the killing occurs outside the traditional male-biased circumstances 
for which self-defense was designed, making retention of a manslaughter-like option necessary, 
whether it be provocation, excessive/imperfect self-defense241 or defensive homicide. 
Conclusion 
Currently, in determining the severity of the punishment for domestic homicides based on 
jealous rage or fear, the emphasis is on different legal actors in different jurisdictions. Some 
Australian states, by abolishing provocation, are limiting the participation of the jury in favor of 
the trial judge through sentencing.242  Canada and some Australian states and territories are 
allowing juries to decide the issue of provocation, but then giving judges substantial ability to 
tailor the sentence for manslaughter to fit the circumstances.243  Finally, in the United States, 
                                                 
240 Wendy Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 175, 176 (1982). 
241  See supra notes 149-151 and accompanying text. 
242 See generally VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, supra note 6.  
243 See, e.g., Crimes Act, 1900, §23(2) (N.S.W.); Crimes Act, 1900, §13(2) (Austl. Cap. Terr.); 
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juries are allowed to decide whether provocation existed.244  However, because of the greater 
variety of determinate sentencing for both manslaughter and murder, in some states there may be 
substantial room for judges to distinguish among people who plead to or are convicted of 
manslaughter based on domestic homicide.245  In others states, regardless of whether the 
defendant is a battered woman or a jealous man, a manslaughter sentence is legislatively 
determined to be lengthy but less severe than a murder sentence.246 
Since social values that are more sympathetic to battered women than jealous men appear 
to have taken root in all three countries, it is highly probable that the main reason for Australia’s 
greater emphasis on substantive equality in its provocation law, including the willingness to 
abolish provocation in some Australian states, is a convergence of strong feminist advocacy and, 
in Tasmania, Victoria, New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory, the lack of 
mandatory minimum sentencing rules for either manslaughter or murder. 
Australian jurisdictions have provided a fascinating new chapter in the history of 
provocation.  Currently in Australia four quite different provocation regimes exist: (1) 
Tasmania’s abolition without making any other changes; (2) Victoria’s abolition while replacing 
manslaughter with defensive homicide; (3) New South Wales and Australian Capital Territory’s 
retention of a relatively enlightened version of the traditional provocation defense without a 
mandatory minimum sentence for murder; and (4) the rest of Australian jurisdictions’ retention 
                                                                                                                                                             
Criminal Code Act Compilation Act, 1913, §281 (W. Austl.); Criminal Code, 1899, § 304 
(Queensl.). 
244 See generally LEE, supra note 18.  
245 See supra note 100. 
246 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE  § 190(a) (first degree murder minimum is twenty-five years); 
§193 (a) (noting that “voluntary manslaughter is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison 
for three, six, or eleven years); see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030(4)(b)(3) (first-degree murder 
sentence minimum is fifty years with eligibility for parole after twenty years served); § 200.080 
(voluntary manslaughter minimum is one year).  
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of traditional provocation rules and mandatory minimum sentences for murder.  Assessing over 
time how each of these different treatments affects pleas and verdicts involving domestic 
homicides will provide evidence of whether one regime clearly assures substantive equality 
better than others.  
Changing social values have allowed substantive gender equality to finally make its way 
into the law of provocation.  In all three countries, the willingness to make concessions for male 
anger as a human frailty in domestic homicide cases appears to be far less prevalent than in the 
past, while empathy for battered women who kill has led to substantive changes in provocation 
law and in its application.  Until changes in law and social norms relating to determinate 
sentencing and self-defense occur, this may be as good as it gets. 
